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HYBRIDS, RIGHTS AND THEIR PROLIFERATION 
 
Lynda Birke and Mike Michael 
 
Introduction 
 
Working out the concept of rights is a complicated business, which at 
least keeps philosophers occupied. Not so long ago, one of us would 
have been denied the right to vote, on the grounds of her gender. Yet 
now, at the turn of the millennium, she is far from sure that we have 
come very far on the question of women's rights. And if women, or 
minorities, or anyone else who is human can sometimes be denied rights, 
then how much more likely that non-humans will be? 
 
Yet extending the concept of rights to non-human animals is increasingly 
being taken seriously. It is debated in academic journals, and forms the 
basis for a growing activism. The publication of books arguing in favour 
of extending rights to at least some animals has proliferated.1 But the 
idea also has its critics. Some criticisms come from those who simply 
wish to keep nonhuman animals out of any moral or political agenda.2 
 
The starting point of this article is the critique of the idea of rights, from 
the perspective of those who are animal advocates3; in particular, we 
start from the premise that the concept of 'rights' is too rooted in 
idealisation of the individual and autonomy. Such idealisation can be 
found in claims about nonhuman animals. But, we would argue, this 
marginalises any concept of relationality. In discussing relationality, we 
aim to address the ways in which relations between human and 
nonhuman animals are embedded in broader networks of inter-relations 
(that range from the evolutionary to the local and cultural). Those 
relations are also a product of the heterogeneous forms of 
communication between individual human and animal, especially in the 
case of companion animals. 
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We want, however, to do more than simply acknowledge relationality;  
we also want to suggest that it can serve as another basis for warranting, 
advocating, particular positive relationships with animals. That is to say, 
we aim to provide a narrative - contrasted to that of 'rights' - that 
prioritises our interrelations with animals in such a way that to harm 
'them' would be to harm 'ourselves'. So, while we might be sympathetic 
to studies of the human-animal relationship, we would see these as 
assuming from the outset discrete humans and animals, whereas we are 
aiming to reach a position where we can 'assume at outset' the 
relationality of humans and animals.4 
 
What we want to pursue here is the question of relationality. Other 
authors have noted the importance of relationships and contexts. Ted 
Benton for example, argues that the social context of both human and 
nonhuman cannot be ignored, while Freya Matthews insists that we 
recognise the commensality of humans and nonhumans.5 We, Matthews 
points out, need animal company; but nature - animals- can benefit from 
our company, too. This is not to deny the existence of appalling abuses 
of animals, she argues, but rather acknowledges the mutuality of many 
human/animal interactions. Similarly Barbara Noske6 argues that our 
society is partly based on its relation to, and exploitation of, animals. In 
this paper, we draw upon a quite different literature: we turn to recent 
work in the sociology of scientific knowledge as a starting point. In 
particular, we draw on the work of Bruno Latour, and his analyses of 
'hybrids'.7  We extend this idea to thinking about two examples of human 
relationship and communication with companion animals - with dogs, 
and with horses. These relationships, we argue, can be thought about as 
instances of hybrids, a concept that sees them as more than the sum of 
the parts. We argue that thinking in terms of hybrids of 
human/nonhuman can be useful in enabling us to move beyond some of 
the problems of individualism that beset debates about rights. 
 
In doing so, we are not making claims for all nonhuman animals 
(although others might wish to extend the analysis further); indeed, we 
offer this paper very much as a preliminary exploration. Nor are we 
seeking to undermine the spirit of animal rights philosophy. On the 
contrary, we are committed to it, but do not find it enough. 
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Right is Wrong? 
 
There have been a number of critics of the philosophy of animal rights - 
indeed, of the concept of rights more generally. Perhaps one of the 
strongest criticisms is that notions of rights rely on a profound separation 
and individuality, as well as prioritising rationality.  Benton8 notes, for 
instance, the basis of our understanding, and the idealisation of certain 
rights in the eighteenth century. He points out that while freedom from 
arrest, and freedom of association were specified, the rights of health, 
bodily integrity, nutrition, and so on, were not. This was, moreover, the 
period of history when our modern separation of nature from culture was 
consolidated; it was the sphere of the 'natural' that was omitted from 
these idealised rights - the needs of the body, and the nonhuman world. 
 
Additionally, Benton reminds us of the ways that notions of rights tend 
to obscure 'the social-relational preconditions' for the emergence of the 
'human individual' as bearer of rights, and with particular qualities, 
attributes and abilities 'in virtue of which they are held to have inherent 
value'.9  'Rights', resting as they do upon some version of individualism, 
neglect the many ways in which our experiences are situated.10 
      
Another point needs to be made. The ideas concerning rights have 
'acquired an exaggerated importance as part of the prestige of the public 
sphere and the masculine, and the emphasis on separation and autonomy, 
on reason and abstraction'.11  Separation and autonomy are defined, 
against others - be they nonhuman animals, an ill-defined 'nature', or 
particular excluded groups of human others.  It is through this process of 
exclusion against, that feminism becomes linked to environmental and 
animal causes:  women, nature and nonhuman animals can, in different 
ways and at different times, become others to the story of separation.  
 
Plumwood argues instead for a form of relationality, which, she reminds 
us, is not the same as the identification with nature sometimes implied in 
writing about deep ecology (too close an identification may blind us to 
understanding an other's suffering).12  Nonhuman animals have their own 
societies, but they are also - deeply - in relationship with other animal 
kinds, including humans.  In different ways, they are in relationship to 
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human societies (although there is a world of difference between the 
'domestic animals', socialised into human societies, and the relationship 
of a wild species to humanity).  
 
Relations with nonhumans:  Introducing Hybrids 
 
The word 'hybrid' has many meanings. It can denote a deliberately bred 
cross between, say, two plant species; it might conjure up 'hybrid vigour'.  
Or, it might carry meanings of illicit mixtures, or something defiled by 
being less pure. 
   
The sense of 'hybrid' that we use here draws on the notion of hybrid 
introduced by Bruno Latour, in his work on technoscience. In a recent 
book, Bruno Latour describes what he considers to be two practices 
central to modernity. On the one hand, there is 'translation', which 
'creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature 
and culture'.13  On the other, there is also 'purification', the process by 
which we keep humans separated off from nonhumans. Modern Western 
culture tends towards the latter, even while busily creating new mixtures 
(sometimes literally, as in the case of genetically engineered organisms). 
 
One problem with the animal rights position, following Latour, is that the 
concept of rights, while apparently denying separation from other animal 
kinds is firmly rooted in it.  All it seems to do is to move the goalposts, to 
allow some kinds of animals onto the pitch. Life, meanwhile, is awfully 
crowded in the stands and onlookers are policed to stop them invading.  
 
But it is precisely because of that history of purification that the practice 
of sociology or anthropology has ignored all else but human-human 
relationships.14  Not surprisingly then, we are unused to thinking about 
all the nonhuman things that contribute to our world, forming chains of 
associations (that are both material and semiotic) with humans and other 
nonhumans. These are part of our social organisation, behind-the-scenes 
contributors - though of course 'social' becomes a misnomer in this 
context for what we see are 'orderings'15 made up of heterogeneous 
elements.  Expanding on this idea, Bruno Latour makes the point that 
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     We are never faced with objects or social relations, we 
     are faced with chains which are associations of humans (H) 
     and nonhumans (NH). No-one has ever seen a social relation 
     by itself...nor a technical relation...Instead we are 
     always faced with chains which look like this H-NH-H-NH-H- 
     NH...16 
 
The 'nonhuman' here may mean a technical artefact; thus, our 
communication with you, the reader, depends upon technological 
relationships, a complex array of computers, software, and international 
institutions.  But, we want to argue, 'nonhuman' can also mean nonhuman 
animals.  
 
Breaking the boundaries of what counts as human usually results in a 
rush to demonstrate the ways in which animals are not rational, are not 
self-aware, are not intelligent, and so on. Separating ourselves off from 
'nature' characterises the modern period, Latour argues. But the study of 
society or culture has itself developed out of that separation, and it 
specifically excludes all nonhuman influence - be that inanimate or 
animate.  Animals, plants, technical artefacts - all belong to the realm of 
the nonsocial; they can be left to be studied by people (scientists) who 
themselves deny the existence of the social in the descriptions they 
themselves make of the nonsocial. Yet isn't the existence of 'society' 
itself crossing the boundary, depending as it does on much more than 
merely human-human relationships? 
  
Latour's work rests on actor-network theory.  Put briefly, this seeks to 
map out complex networks of humans and nonhumans. The world of 
actor-network theory is partly ruled by the generalized 'principle of 
symmetry' that Bruno Latour and Michel Callon17 have advocated. In 
essence, this principle rejects any a priori distinctions between the 
human and the nonhuman, agent and object, the social and the natural or 
the technological (such distinctions are all too often simply assumed, 
they point out). Thus, what is to count as 'human' or 'natural' or 
'technological' is a matter of struggle between various actors such as 
scientists, policy makers, lay publics and the like.  One relevant example 
of this would be current debates about the moral status of the great apes;  
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there is ongoing political struggle over whether they might be 'counted' 
as animals (part of nature) or at least partly be admitted to the realm of 
the human.18      
 
It is, then, a matter of empirical investigation as to what has emerged as 
'natural', 'artificial' or 'cultural'. More recently, Latour has elaborated this 
view19 to argue that human and nonhumans alike are interfused with all 
manner of nonhumans and humans (the network). Such heterogeneity is 
characteristic of the modern condition (indeed, all conditions). Despite 
our best modernist efforts at denying the 'exchange of properties' 
between - that is, purifying - humans and nonhumans, this heterogeneous 
process of mingling continues apace. What makes this theory different 
from many others is its insistence that nonhuman - technological and 
'natural' - are present in the production of every 'ordering' of relations.  
We are always comprising hybrids, temporary or less temporary 
associations with a vast array of nonhumans. 
 
So, if we are to describe a person's relationship to her dog in these terms, 
then we must speak not only of the human-and-the-dog, but also of the 
other 'allies' that influence that relationship. Whatever other networks she 
engages in, Lynda is also 'enrolled' into certain networks by the dogs she 
lives with. This includes the dogleads and their manufacturers (see 
below), the producers of dog food, dog beds and canine distemper 
vaccine, veterinary surgeons - not to mention the resident cat. To put it in 
terms of hybrids: the hybrid 'Lynda-dog-lead-dog' is constituted through 
and depends upon these various networks. This, of course, is no different 
from the production of 'human individuals' who are an effect of those 
networks that poststructuralists have deconstructed. We shall return to 
the nature of these networks below.  
 
Relationalities and Animals 
 
There has recently been an upsurge in writing about the 'human-animal 
relationship'. New books and journals appear, marking this out as a new 
area of study. That focus is certainly welcome, and makes a refreshing 
change from the assumption that animals are completely separate from 
us. Yet, perusing the contents of those journals is sometimes 
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disappointing. What we find are examples of animals bringing benefits to 
humans, in hospitals, in our homes, to children, to disabled people.   
Some articles may tell us of how human contact can benefit animals 
(usually companion animals); but very few speak of the relationship 
between the two. In what follows, we will explore two examples in order 
to explicate this 'relationality'. But before we embark upon this, a little 
theoretical gloss is in order, if only to clarify what we are attempting to 
do as we switch registers from the local (personal) interactions between 
humans and animals to evolutionary relations.  
 
What is a human? The production of humans relies on particular 
techniques, practices, discourses - what Rose20 calls 'subjectifying 
technologies'. These include what Rose refers to as the psy disciplines 
(psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis), though many 
other practices and technologies also shape 'the human'. The psy 
disciplines, for example, help to give coherence to the notion of a unitary 
individual, as well as contributing to the values and interests that are 
invested in such a figure. 
   
What we are attempting here, albeit tentatively, is to do something 
similar for another character - the human-animal hybrid. So, rather than 
accept the ideas of individualism and rights, we can write a different 
story, that contributes to a concept of human-nonhuman hybridity. We 
could begin, for instance, by pointing to how this figure/character/actor 
is grounded in, and emerges out of, the evolutionary history of 
domestication, or to various pre- and pro-scriptions regarding how such 
human/nonhuman hybrids should behave. 
 
If we thus begin by assuming human/animal relationality - or the 
existence of the hybrid - then we can speak in terms of the co-production 
and mutual emergence of humans and animals.  To discriminate against 
the latter, becomes akin to discriminating against the former, for these, 
indeed, cannot be separated. With this overview in mind, let us proceed 
with storying our hybrid.  
Speaking for - or otherworldly conversations? 
 
 8 
Animal companions, or pets, have long been known to have therapeutic 
effects upon their owners. In particular, owners claim that 'their animals 
are sensitive to their (the owners') moods and feelings'.21  The processes 
of communication that are evident here are clearly not linguistic, but 
vocal, visual and tactile. However, animals' lack of linguistic ability may 
be one of their prime assets in that animals cannot, as a consequence 
judge, betray or criticise - their feelings for the human are apparently 
uncontingent. But this intimacy does not preclude humans from 'speaking 
for' their animal companions.  As Sanders notes: 
 
     Because the animal is 'mute', caretakers often find 
     themselves in situations in which they must 'speak for' 
     their nonhuman companions.  In so doing, they make use of 
     a rich body of knowledge derived from an intimate 
     understanding of the animal-other built up in the course of 
     day-to-day interactional experience. Dog owners commonly 
     give voice to what they perceive to be their animals' 
     mental, emotional, and physical experiences.22 
 
Such patterns of 'speaking for' suggests a process of retelling, by humans, 
of their own and animals' experiences with the aid of more or less 
familiar stories. But that does not mean we should not take them 
seriously. 
 
Indeed, we would argue that there is a serious problem with a sociology 
which persistently ignores animal others, for it remains rooted in the 
persistent dualism of nature and culture. Many animal 'others' are deeply 
integral to human societies - indeed, as Benton argues23, they are partly 
constitutive of our society in many ways.  But understanding this does 
not mean that we have to objectify them, or even to accord them human 
status (as seems to be implied in some formulations of rights). Feminist 
historian of science Donna Haraway, reflecting on these issues, suggests 
that: 
 
     The last thing 'they' (animals) need is human subject 
     status, in whatever cultural-historical form...  We need 
     other terms of conversations with animals, a much less 
     respectable undertaking.  The point is not new 
     representations, but new practices, other forms of life 
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     rejoining humans and nothumans.24 
 
Out of this emerges, Haraway hopes, a new form of human being: 
 
     Once the world of subjects and objects is put into 
     question, that paradox concerns the congeries, or curious 
     confederacy, that is the self, as well as selves' relations 
     with others.  A promising form of life, conversation defies 
     the autonomization of the self, as well as the 
     objectification of the other.24  
 
So, what happens as we engage in those non-linguistic conversations 
with animal others is a diffusion of the (human) self. The human identity 
that emerges from these conversations is no longer linear, but is realised 
through all forms of communication. We want to emphasise that that 
process must include nonverbal communications, with nonhuman 
actors.25 
 
We might say that animals are mute only if we remain deaf. As Kath 
Smart has shown26, dogbreeders believe themselves to be in conversation 
with their animals, and sometimes even under scrutiny or surveillance - a 
perception familiar to anyone who works closely with animals in similar 
ways. That perception implies an agency, that the dogs are somehow 
enrolling the humans into the association.  The idea that there is co-
agency between (some) nonhuman animals and humans is not, of course, 
new to animal trainers and breeders.  But it is not part of the descriptions 
of the world to be found in academic disciplines; there, the purification 
of human culture - to which Latour refers - is endemic. Humans have 
their own society; animals belong to the other side of a heavily policed 
boundary (within the natural sciences). 
 
But the boundaries tend to break down, as Latour emphasised (see note 
7). For example, in contrast to the familiar story that humans 
'domesticated' dogs in prehistory, Budiansky27 contends that animals 
such as dogs 'chose' us. They were, he suggests, drawn to human 
communities, to the shelter, food and protection they might offer. In that 
case, the domestication of dogs 'is an evolutionary phenomenon rather 
than a human invention'. Dogs, we might say, have a long history of 
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enrolling humans, just as we have one with them. Both have adapted to 
each other, and both are (sometimes) in deeply mutual communication. 
Here, we have a story that crosses the boundary of 'natural science' 
(evolution, animals) and 'sociology' (human society). 
 
One way in which human-dog communication is manifest occurs when 
we observe a person 'taking her dog for a walk'. Usually, this involves a 
technological artefact - the doglead. This object, however, mediates 
exchanges between the human and dog, and blurs the site of agency. 
Who is the user - human or dog? Who does the configuring - animal, 
lead, or human? For example, dogs may have their own agendas; 
sometimes, these fit with human agendas - sometimes, they do not, as is 
often the case with Lynda and her three dogs-plus-dogleads. Agency, in 
that case, is a complicated business. 
  
Dogs, indeed, may resist human desires (witness the reluctance to enter 
the veterinary surgery, or the desire to jump off the table once there). But 
even when they cooperate, agency is evident. In other words, dogs may 
be committed to a certain 'contract' and will bring their 'handlers' into 
line. But also, the fulfilment and maintenance of the contract is 
continuously performed through communication, at many levels, 
between human and dog. 
  
This process of negotiation is partly conducted through the medium of 
the doglead - especially so in urban areas,28 where it is the hybrid of 
human-doglead-dog who must negotiate the tricky terrain. The doglead 
then permits a mutuality - both human and dog look out for objects or 
events on the other's behalf. In some cases, the dog's agency is more 
prominent, as is the case with guide dogs. Stories abound among those 
working with 'service animals' of the animal acting heroically (leaping 
under the wheels of a sliding wheelchair, for instance) - agency, indeed. 
 
We turn now to another example - that of human/horse interactions.  
Again, the popular image is one of humans using and dominating horses 
(as exemplified in the rather misleading phrase, to break a horse).  Partly 
for that reason, there are some in the animal rights movement who 
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consider that it is morally wrong to ride horses. But this position again 
plays down any mutuality.  
  
Here, the 'hybrid' we might describe consists of human-bridle-horse.  
Communication between the two living entities takes place partly 
through the medium of the bridle or halter, and partly kinaesthetically - 
through movement and its sensing. As with dogs, there is a continuous 
subtle play of conversation: for horses are large animals and cannot be 
dominated (even very small ones, like Shetland ponies, can beat puny 
human strength). They will, however, agree to converse. 
 
Now it is also true that there are many, many instances of abuse by 
humans - a breaking of the contract, as it were. Such acts may, in part, 
reflect a belief in domination. But to what extent can humans truly 
dominate an animal, especially if it is the size of many horses? On the 
contrary, 'learning to ride' means not only acquiring certain physical 
skills, but also learning a new, largely tactile, language. Through that 
means, we can communicate with the horse. But the horse also has 
agency; it can - easily - refuse to work with us. Certainly, if a horse does 
not want to go over a jump, it will not - just as it will show agency by 
resistance if, say, a human mishandles the intervening technology (by 
grabbing at the reins and hurting the horse's mouth). 
 
There are certainly some among animal rights activists who believe that 
it is morally wrong to 'make' horses jump obstacles - especially in 
contexts where there is a risk of injury. There have, as a result, been 
demonstrations at several international equestrian events. Whatever the 
merits of their claim, it is somewhat ironic that demonstrations focus on 
the 'showpiece' events, for it is there that the 'hybrids' are policed most 
strongly.  The literature of the 'horse world' relies on a rhetoric of 
welfare, in which the horse's needs are paramount.29 Human-bridle-horse 
hybrids must follow particular rules, at least in public arenas. To an 
extent, the horse takes part in this rule-following.  
 
Domestic animals, such as dogs and horses, are socialised into a society.   
By that we mean not only their own society (the local community of dogs 
at the breeders, or the horses at the stud), but also into human society.  
 12 
What we should perhaps be insisting on, indeed, is a notion of a hybrid 
society, consisting of humans along with nonhumans. Just like a human 
infant, a young animal must be socialised into that hybrid society: both 
kinds of infants must 'learn the rules' about other members of society. 
 
Part of the prevailing view that nonhuman animals are domesticated by 
us is the claim that, underneath the veneer of domestication, there is a 
'wild' animal, driven by archaic instincts. This additive view, of the thin 
veneer of culture overlaying baser wildness, fails to address the social 
embeddedness of domestic animals.  Yet we project our social 
expectations onto domestic animals, and sometimes they behave 
accordingly. For example, within the world of 'horse people' (a curiously 
hybrid phrase, to be sure!), there are many humans who will avoid mares, 
in the belief that they are less 'trainable'; stallions, too,  are often thought 
to be 'difficult'.  Yet - if true - how much of that is due to human 
expectations and to socialisation? If humans socialise the animal into a 
role of being 'difficult' (that is, less susceptible to mutual 
communication), then that is what it will become. So, too, may human 
children.  
 
Returning to the theme of animal rights, we have argued that one 
important problem with rights is its emphasis on individuality, rather 
than relationality. This in turn is deeply entwined with the historically 
contingent separation of 'nature' from 'culture' in the West. That 
separation then excludes the place of (at least some) animals in society 
and culture,  and their interests in maintaining that place. 
 
The problems of the ways that animals may be treated today by humans 
arise in large part from their relegation to the (inferior) world of nature. 
That is not to say that prior to the modern period, animals were treated 
well; they were not. But a characteristic of modernity is the deep anxiety 
to police the boundaries of human culture (or even of Western culture); 
as Latour puts it (note 7), we are obsessed with purification.  One 
manifestation of this is our constant need in the West to return nonhuman 
animals to their 'place' in nature. Because of this, we tend to have 
difficulties with those nonhuman animals whose place is by our sides; 
are they in nature, or do they belong to culture? 
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Yet the very same culture so preoccupied with purifying its boundaries 
also works to transgress them. Science, for example, does both. The 
practice of science assumes a separation from nature (hence the supposed 
objective stance, by which scientists claim to 'know' nature, while 
denying their own cultural contingencies); but simultaneously, it denies 
separation (evolutionary theory and genetics) and even creates boundary-
crossing organisms (hybrids and chimeras abound in the new age of 
biotechnology). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Our use of the idea of hybrids is deliberate.  We are not necessarily 
advocating a literal interbreeding of people and other animals (which is 
another debate).  Rather, we want to use the concept of hybridity for two 
related reasons.  The first is that the notion of a hybrid implies boundary-
crossing and mixing - if not literally, then certainly at a conceptual level.  
This confounds issues of what is human? or what is animal? or even 
what is an individual?  At the very least, that confounding should help to 
destabilise that tired old division between nature and culture. 
 
Hybrids also open up a space, secondly, to think about relationality. Now 
we have used the term hybrid to emphasise the conjoint nature of the 
hybrid, and its co-agency.  As critics of the nature/culture or 
nature/nurture dualisms have often bewailed, it is all too easy to invoke 
some kind of addition (nurture adds onto the nature base), or a simple 
interaction (A can affect B, which can affect A30). But even this can still 
be split apart - indeed, that splitting is often required by the very methods 
by which we might study something.  So, we might choose to study 'the 
human/dog relationship' as a function of doggy effects on humans (such 
as reduction of heart rate if you go patting a dog), or perhaps of human 
effects on dogs (selective breeding, say). 
   
Yet what is missing from, or played down by, this kind of account is the 
mutuality; both human and dog become changed, and become more than 
simple person-plus-dog. By trying to think about this chimerical being as 
a hybrid, we want to emphasise that 'more than'.  Lynda is a part of many 
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human networks, but also at times comes together with dogs and horses 
to create temporary hybrids:  these, in turn, generate other networks of 
humans and nonhumans. 
   
One extreme position we have encountered among animal rights activists 
is the idea that it is wrong to 'keep pets', that the animals should be free 
to wander and to 'be themselves', that they have intrinsic rights to 
freedom.  But in this specific case - companion animals - such a stance 
would deny their relationships with humans.  It is also based on a highly 
idealised notion of 'freedom', for who among us humans has such 
freedom?  Aren't we all constrained by, among other things, our 
relationships with other beings?  Invoking individual 'rights' seems to 
gloss over those constraints, and to ignore the very relationality on which 
we (and many nonhuman animals) base our social lives. 
 
Now in seeking to emphasise that relationality, we recognise its 
limitations when it comes to other human uses of animals. We want here 
to use the idea with regard to companion animals. When it comes to 
intensive farming, the rhetoric of rights is probably more politically 
useful;  even the more liberal welfare lobby talk about ensuring that 
certain animal needs are met. 
 
The use of animals in scientific experimentation is another area where to 
insist on at least some rights may be a useful political strategy.  Thus,  
those involved in reform or working for welfare might argue that 
laboratory animals have a right to a certain amount of space in their 
living quarters.  Even so, we should remember that the practice of using 
animals itself seems to require that scientists' separate themselves off 
from the animals, that they psychologically and culturally deny any 
relationality. Indeed, on those occasions where laboratory animals 
become individually incorporated into relationships with people (as 'lab 
pets', say), then they usually are 'saved' from the experiments.31  
 
Much modern theorising about evolution seems to stress individuality (or 
even to shift it onto selfish genes).  Thus, despite the appeal of Darwin's 
ideas to those of us who see kindred spirits in the nonhuman world, we 
inherit a cultural tendency towards atomism. Yet there are also 
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evolutionary theorists who do not see such atomism in the natural world, 
who emphasise instead the co-evolution of ecologically interrelated 
species.32  Rather than seeing individual species or populations as rather 
passively adapted to a (largely inert) environment,  this reformulation 
insists on mapping out the networks of interrelationships and effects. 
Indeed, an animal's or a species' environment is constituted by other 
organisms, including humans - hybrids aplenty. 
 
And there, to return to Val Plumwood's analysis of ideas of nature, lies 
the difficulty at the heart of rights theory. For while we might speak of 
the 'rights' of animal A to roam free 'around its environment', that is to 
ignore the 'rights' of other organisms. To take the oft-used example, 
whose rights should we then heed, the sheep or the wolf? 
  
We have borrowed here from the concepts of hybridity and actor-
networks, developed in the literature on sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Their relevance to a discussion of our relationship to animals 
is twofold - they explicitly problematise the separation of nature from 
culture, and they relocate humans individuals back into networks of other 
actors including nonhumans.  Whether we speak of events over 
evolutionary time, or seek to describe human relationships with (certain) 
animals now, any rhetoric of individualism is limited.  
 
Instead, we must try to develop a relational framework, and to develop an 
ethical stance from that. It is not necessarily in the best interests of 
companion animals (at least) to talk of their individual 'rights to roam 
free' (where?). Nor is it necessarily to deny them some intrinsic freedom 
to follow their instincts - a belief which maintains the notion that 
nonhuman animals are 'in nature' in ways that we are not.  
   
Once we think in terms of hybrids between culturally specific humans,  
nonhuman nature, and even technical artefacts (this, it should be noted, 
could include ecosystems), then perhaps we can develop a language of 
interests that apply to the hybrid. Among other things, hybrids are 
conjoint entities: they are not simply one entity sitting alongside another. 
As a consequence, hurting one part of a hybrid hurts the rest.33  Perhaps 
this move will not always work to protect the interest of either humans or 
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nonhumans.34  But, we want to insist, seeing individuals as bearers of 
atomistic rights does not work well either, not least because it ignores 
our collective social networks. 
 
We need, to return to Donna Haraway's insights, to develop new forms of 
conversation with nonhuman others, to explore and celebrate our joint 
kinship.35  In so doing, our highly overdeveloped sense of selfhood 
might begin to diminish; we might even allow a breaching of our 
boundaries. Lest that sound too anthropocentric, nonhuman animals 
stand to benefit; for their relationships with less egocentric and territorial 
humans are likely to be more welcoming and communicative. To speak 
of their 'rights' seems only to reinforce our own selves and boundaries.  
Surely they - and we - deserve better than that? 
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BABE :  THE TALE OF THE SPEAKING MEAT;  PART ll 
 
Val Plumwood 
 
SYNOPSIS OF PART 1: In Part 1, I suggested that the film Babe  
provided a valuable context in which to discuss the replacement of the 
Cartesian mechanistic model of animals, which has dominated the 
industrial world since the Enlightenment, by a communicative model 
which is more suited to survival in an ecological age. The film offers a 
recognition of communicative virtues and characteristics as central to 
both human and nonhuman forms of life, and a vision of the emergence 
of communicative forms of relationship as victorious alternatives to 
forms based on violence, domination and terror.  Focussing on the 
paradox of the speaking meat the leading character Babe represents, I 
argued that one of the great strengths of the film is that it invites us to 
challenge some of the blocks and erasures which support our denial of 
the meat animal as a communicative subject.  As Babe's drama of 
recognition reveals the multiple insensitivities and denials of kinship that 
are part of the meaning of meat in our society, we can grasp the 
possibility of alternative meanings that recognise food as kin.  I outlined 
a context-sensitive approach to vegetarianism which refuses cultural 
universalism and recognises the radically different ethical meanings meat 
can have in different societies.  Finally I explored some of the ethical and 
political ambiguities of communicative forms, and the tantalising 
questions Babe  raises about the communicative farm.  Will the new 
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm 
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit 
ways?  Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic 
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand 
to the more repressive forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance they 
replaced?    
 
NOW READ ON to discover in PART 11 the moral ambiguities of the 
human-animal contract, the conceptual traps of pet/meat and person 
/property dualism, and why we need a politics of animal justice. 
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4: Communication and Anthropomorphism  
Babe's opening shot shows Babe waking in communicative interaction 
with siblings, expressing sorrow at the loss of his mother and fear as he 
is seized and carried away.  These are all emotions we can realistically 
expect real pigs to feel and express in this situation, and Babe's 'human' 
speech as it emerges in this context seems a natural expression of these 
emotions, wishes and beliefs. The animal communication introduced here 
works well because it continues and extends the normal body language 
and communication of the animals.  Nevertheless, the representation of 
such animal subjectivity in human terms is often said to be irresolutely 
problematic and invalidly 'anthropomorphic'.  It is worth considering and 
clarifying this charge in relation to the representation of animal 
communication and subjectivity in works of art.  I will argue that there is 
no good basis for the general claim that an artwork is invalidated by 
anthropomorphism merely on the ground that it attributes subjectivity 
and communication to nonhumans. The problems in representing other 
species' communicative powers or subjectivities in terms of human 
speech are real, but they do not rule out such representation in any 
general way, and they pale before the difficulties of failing to represent 
them at all, or before the enormity of representing communicative and 
intentional beings as beings lacking all communicative and mental 
capacity.  That is a much greater inaccuracy and injustice than any 
anthropomorphism could be. 
 
We need to distinguish various senses of anthropomorphism, including 
general and specific senses.  The general concept and charge of 
anthropomorphism, as Mary Midgley1 has argued, is in its usual sense 
and definition thoroughly confused.  It is ambiguous as between 
attributing to nonhumans characteristics humans have (OED), and 
attributing to nonhumans characteristics only humans have.  Both senses 
are problematic, in slightly different ways, when used to support the 
claim that the attribution of characteristics such as subjectivity to animals 
must be anthropomorphic.  The first sense, that something is 
anthropomorphic if it attributes to animals characteristics humans have, 
implies that there is no overlap of characteristics between humans and 
nonhuman animals.  That is, it assumes a hyperseparation of human and 
animal natures and attempts to enforce upon legitimate representations of 
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nonhumans such a radical discontinuity.  This sense should clearly be 
rejected, not only because it is based on a demonstrably false assumption 
of radical discontinuity, but because it can be used to delegitimate 
virtually any depiction of nonhuman subjectivity that made sense to us.  
 
The second sense of anthropomorphism - attributing to nonhumans 
characteristics only humans have - is not open to this objection, but is 
open to the objection that its use to delegitimate the attribution of 
subjectivity and other contested characteristics to nonhumans is simply 
question-begging.  It assumes just what is at issue, what opponents of the 
mechanistic model contest, that nonhumans do not have characteristics 
such as subjectivity and intentionality humans also possess.  As Midgley 
notes, the focus of this sense of the concept tends to be otiose and 
human-centred.  If something is to be faulted for attributing to 
nonhumans characteristics they do not have, it is sufficient to point out 
that this is an inaccurate way of representing them, and the inaccuracy 
itself provides (in a suitably veridical context) sufficient independent 
ground for rejecting such an attribution.  Unless there is a good reason 
for addressing the question of similarity to humans, it is simply 
anthrocentric to go on to bring every source of comparison and focus of 
assessment back to humans and to an animal's similarity or difference 
from them, as the concept of anthropomorphism tends to do.   
 
The critic of representing animals in communicative terms often draws 
on another sense of anthropomorphism which is closely analogous to the 
concept of weak anthrocentrism2, and which, like weak anthrocentrism,  
makes it very hard or impossible for representations of nonhumans to 
avoid being assigned the label anthropomorphism. This is a weak sense 
which locates anthropomorphism in the presentation of animal 
communication 'in human terms', from a human conceptual location. Any 
representation of the speech-content for a human audience will have to 
be an interpretation in terms of human concepts, and in that weak sense, 
a background level of anthropomorphism is always likely to be present. 
What is much more difficult to demonstrate is that anthropomorphism of 
this background kind, in the weak sense of employing a human 
conceptual apparatus or conceptual location, is necessarily harmful or 
invalidating, or that there are no practices which can counter it.   
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Where the charge of anthropomorphism can lead to the application of 
more stringent standards to the representation of animal communication 
than are used to judge the success of comparable human representation, it 
is itself liable to the counter-charge that it is anthrocentric. Arguments of 
this kind are often advanced to show that any representation of animal 
communication is rendered illegitimately anthropomorphic because of 
problems of translation and indeterminacy, although problems are also 
familiar in the representation of human cultural difference.  There are 
parallel difficulties for both cross-cultural and cross-species 
representation: a weak cross-cultural analogue to background 
anthropomorphism is involved in virtually any translation project, for 
example, in any attempt to 'bring over' one culture's forms into another's.  
To avoid delegitimating all such attempts, we need to distinguish the 
impact of weaker and stronger forms of anthropo- morphism, just as we 
need to distinguish weak and usually harmless forms of anthropocentrism 
from strong and damaging forms.3 Weak forms are unavoidable but not 
necessarily harmful, while strong forms may be damaging but are by no 
means inevitable. As with anthro- centrism, the confusion between the 
two forms gives rise to the illusion that damaging forms are inevitable.  
 
Once we proceed beyond these weak general senses, the concept of 
anthropomorphism is somewhat ill-defined, and the features being 
problematised under that description can usually be better characterised 
in terms of anthropocentrism rather than anthropomorphism.  But in the 
same way, the charge of anthropocentrism cannot be used in a 
generalised form to delegitimate representations of nonhumans as 
communicative subjects.  There may still sometimes be a point to the 
charge of strong anthropomorphism, but it becomes much harder to 
demonstrate.  As in the case of weak anthrocentrism, the question is not 
whether or not some degree of humanisation of perspective is present in 
any particular human representation of animal communication, for it 
always will be at the background level, but how damaging it is, what is 
its meaning, and what practices can be used to counter it?  Since the 
inevitable presence of background levels of anthromorphism means that 
the charge of impurity can always be raised, it is helpful here to 
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distinguish the motives for raising it.  Are there ever legitimate problems 
the charge points to? 
 
We have seen that a commonplace motivation for raising the charge of 
anthropomorphism is a rationalist-Cartesian policing of human-animal 
discontinuity, to maintain the human observer's distance from and  
indifference to the animal observed.  Although there is in response to the 
dominant Cartesian-rationalist stress on discontinuity often a need to 
provide a counterstress on continuity between the human and animal, the 
question of anthropomorphism can often be raised with some greater 
validity in the context of the denial of difference which is a key part of 
structures of subordination and colonisation to which animals are 
subject.4  The charge of anthropomorphism may then legitimately draw 
our attention to a loss of sensitivity to and respect for animal difference 
in humanisation or in representation.  The concern about lack of respect 
for difference can extend to cover even well-meaning animal rights 
attempts to assimilate animals within the model of the person, in contexts 
where there has been no associated attempt to deconstruct the 
person/property dualism formative of liberalism. 
 
But there are a host of dangers in this area uneasiness about 
anthropomorphism may reflect:  the infantilisation of animals which their 
insertion into the structures of the private household as pets or their 
treatment as adjuncts to human children tends to produce is just one of 
the forms of humanisation associated with the structuring of what 
domestic animals can become in terms of the limiting slots available for 
them in human society.  The charge of humanisation can draw attention 
to the reduction of the animal which appears in demeaning or 
subordinated forms of humanisation.  But some kinds of uneasiness 
about the influence of the human  are less warranted.  It is only too easy  
to adopt here over-strong criteria which unwittingly re-invest in  human-
animal dualism through the assumption that the only genuine animal is 
the wild animal, the animal completely apart from and uninfluenced by 
human society, (just as the only genuine indigene is one who looks and 
sounds exactly as before the days of contact). The genuine problem here 
is not so much human influence and relationship itself, which is not 
inevitably corrupting or demeaning, but the reduction of animals which 
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so often accompanies their insertion as subordinates, deviants or 
resources into an anthropocentric culture.  A solution does not have to try 
to maintain or represent an 'ideal' pure animal uninfluenced by 
interaction with the human - although every effort should be made to 
maintain wild animals in their own ecosystems - but to reach out for 
relationships that allow for both species together some kind of fullness of 
becoming, or, as Freya Mathews puts it, allows the animal to 'achieve a 
significant degree of the form of self-realisation appropriate to its 
particular kind'.5  The mixed farm of Babe showed some of the 
possibilities here, especially for the working dogs.   
 
A parallel set of issues arise in the case of representation.  As in the case 
of the human other, so in the animal, such representations must always 
raise questions about supplanting and assimilating the other.  However 
there can be no general argument that such cross-cultural perspectives 
presenting another's viewpoint, are deceptive or illegitimate.  Cross-
species representation, like cross-cultural representation, is not 
automatically colonising or self-imposing, and may express motives and 
meanings of sympathy, support and admiration.  Rather, specific cases 
have to be argued on their merits, not just in terms of the alleged 
intrusion of non-indigenous or human impurities, but in terms of the 
kinds of insights they present or prevent and the moral quality of their 
representation.6  We need to put into place here counter-practices which 
oppose colonising tendencies in these contexts.  For example, 
representation should keep in mind the distinction between claiming to 
be rather than to represent an other's perspective, to see or speak as the 
other rather than to see or speak with the other.7  In the case of 
translation and indeterminacy, counter-practices could require an effort 
to note non-equivalences in forms of life and to treat difficulties about 
translation as sources of uncertainty and tentativeness.  Using the 
problems of such an approach as a model, we might expect an 
appropriate methodology for dealing with cross-species conceptual 
difference and translation indeterminacy to be one which stressed 
corrigibility and open expectations.  Dealing with both human and 
nonhuman cases of translation indeterminacy requires openness to the 
other and careful, sensitive, and self-critical observation which actively 
seeks to uncover perspectival and centric biases8.    
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So I don't think it can be argued that Babe is lacking in proper respect for 
animal difference because it represents animal subjectivity and 
communication in terms of human language, any more than it can be 
argued that cross-cultural translation is inevitably hegemonic. 
Undoubtedly there can be great variations and moral differences here, but 
again, we cannot reject as automatically colonising the mixed or impure 
perspective which places a human subjectivity into an animal situation. 
Indeed, as the Larsen cartoon about why dinosaurs died out 
demonstrates, such 'anthropomorphic' transferences of perspective may 
be not only funny but philosophically revealing, about ourselves as well 
as about the other. They can enable us to enter into, if not the other's 
subjectivity, the other's situation, and that can contribute to our 
understanding and sympathy.  Here, much depends upon the stance the 
work takes towards the anthrocentrism it represents:  rather than being 
the bearer of an insidious and unexamined inferiorisation of the other, 
the imposition of an obviously human framework may be the joke, a joke 
that is partly on us, and which precisely invites reflection about human 
importations. 
 
Cross-species representations then are not necessarily but can be 
unacceptably human-centred.  Our civilisation is haunted by animal 
images, but those images themselves are often made complicit in the 
project of subordinating real animals and eliminating them from our 
lives.  The privileging of the representation of animals over the animals 
represented is a widespread form of human-centredness which is 
symptomatic of the growing success of the project of human self-
enclosure.  This danger is especially acute in cases like Babe where films 
use living animal actors, rather than more indirect forms of 
representation.  The animal justice movement has been right to raise 
questions about the treatment of animals actors in animal films during 
and after film-making, although perhaps less right where it has ignored 
the difference between the willing participation of domestic animal 
actors and the coerced participation of wild animals, and insisted upon 
conditions so stringent that they would prevent any participation of 
domestic animals in filmic events.  
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The project of human self-enclosure and its privileging of animal 
representation over animal lives is routinised in popular representations 
of animality.  Compare the kind of humanisation displayed in Babe with 
the Disney paradigm of humanisation.  Disney cartoons, as John Berger 
has noted, are usually only superficially about animals; Disney characters 
with stereotypical animal bodies often have totally humanised 
personalities, frequently incorporate little or no recognisable reference to 
the characteristics or situations of the animals represented, and are 
permitted no critical reflection on their relationship to the human 
community or membership of the mixed community.  The animal form 
appears in this anthrocentric conception as a nullity which is made to 
bear the burden of meanings which have no connection with the animal's 
own subjectivity or situation.  The Disney paradigm, normalised in 
television cartoons, is one in which animals are, in John Berger's words,  
'totally transformed into human puppets' whose main role is to naturalise 
various hegemonic forms of the human condition by attributing them to 
the animal 'kingdom'.9  
 
The erasure of animals in the Disney animal cartoon is objectionable for 
reasons that directly reflect its anthrocentrism and its contribution to the 
incorporation of the other, in this case expressed in the inability to 
encounter the animal respectfully as an independent other who is more 
than a disguised form of self. These movements to incorporate the other 
also underlie the highly anthrocentric assumption I criticised above,  that 
an 'animal film' can only be taken seriously to the extent that it is actually 
about humans.  In contrast, a less anthrocentric and belittling treatment 
would take animals seriously as agents, communicative subjects, bearers 
of knowledge, and members of the mixed community who are 
themselves able to observe us and perhaps to reflect critically on us and 
their relationships with us.  On these sorts of criteria of anthrocentrism in 
the treatment of the animal other, I think 'our Babe' comes out rather 
well. 'Eatin' pigs! Barbaric!' exclaims the ewe Maa when she learns of 
the Hoggett's intention to eat Babe.  The animal gaze, we are reminded, 
can also capture and evaluate us.  
 
The criminalised, women, animals - all these are bearers of a denied or 
lessened form of subjecthood, which cannot itself command the position 
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of knower but which is the object of an arrogant form of knowledge 
which so stereotypes and denies their difference and their speech that 
they are obliterated as possible subjects of reciprocal exchange or  
dialogical encounter.  As Foucault notes, to be always under such an 
arrogating observation is also the fate of the prisoner, and as feminists 
have pointed out, a feminised subjectivity is one in which the subject 
internalises such a male gaze.  John Berger10 has claimed that this 
arrogating conception of the other has now gone so far for animals that 
the animal proper is now irrecoverable for us as a possible other for 
encounter and communicative exchange.  He writes: 'animals are always 
the observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance. 
They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know 
about them is an index of our power, and thus an index of what separates 
us from them. The more we know, the further away they are'.11  This 
diagnosis is acute but perhaps too fatalistic.  There are cultural means to 
problematise and subvert these anthrocentric conceptions of the animal, 
to recover the animal as subject and reciprocal observer rather than as 
background, passively observed object; it is encouraging then that in the 
final shot of Babe, it is the animal who looks back.  
 
5: Meat and the Colonising Contract   
Among the film's other pleasures are the way the lead character Babe, 
from his position as speaking meat, systematically disrupts each of the 
background assumptions of meat I identified in Part 1. In the initial 
scenes of the film, we have (briefly) to confront the first assumption of 
the multiple and emphatic denials of kinship presupposed by the factory 
farm, and the second as we are introduced to the meat as a speaking 
subject. The third assumption, that of a neat, rational and unproblematic 
hierarchy of considerability based on intellectual ranking, is 
systematically disrupted by Babe and several other characters throughout 
the film, and this is one of its best subversive achievements. Thus Babe's 
assertion of intelligence and communicative status disrupts Fly's 
comfortable assurances to her puppies that 'only stupid animals'  are 
eaten.  This disruption poses ethical and political questions,  analogous 
to questions arising in post-colonial theory about the role of colonial 
hierarchies, about the distinction between meat and non-meat animals, 
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and about the nature of the human contract with that special, more 
privileged group of animals who can never be 'meat'.                                                                     
 
'Babe' is the name of an innocent, an original, Christlike pure soul, to 
whom the first news of the dirty secret of meat is eventually revealed in 
the outhouse by the revolutionary duck Ferdie - where the meat comes 
from, where Babe ('babies') himself comes from, in an act of 
disillusionment which neatly parallels that of the human child newly 
discovering reproductive and sexual relationships. ('Not the Boss!' 
breathes the incredulous Babe, in parallel with the child's shocked 'Not 
my parents!')  But it is from the malevolent cat that Babe finally learns 
the full hurt of the dreadful secret the factory farm and the sinister farm 
meathouse hold.  The unspeakable is finally spoken: pigs are meat, pigs 
are subjects, and pigs suffer the reductive violence which denies,  
distances from and hides their subjectivity.  Babe is only called 'pig' 
while he is alive, but  'they use a different word, "pork or bacon", after 
you are dead', explains the satisfied cat, revelling in her privileged, 
protected status.  As Babe's innocence is stripped away bit by bit, we see 
the gradual unveiling of various levels and kinds of animal oppressions 
and colonisations - the baring of the 'world of wounds' we all somehow 
learn to come to terms with as part of our loss of innocence and 'adult' 
accomodation to an oppressive world. 
 
Positioned as counter to these unveilings of oppression are various 
emancipatory comments and viewpoints from the animals who appear as 
sceptical and critical spectators of the human show. Their comments 
deftly expose the politics of the mixed community, especially its human 
violence and surrogate dog violence, and the strangeness of human ways.  
They give us positive perspectives on the importance of listening to and 
being open to others, and on the injustice, distortion and violence of the 
exclusionary boundaries which keep Babe positioned as meat.  We feel 
the thrill of broken chains, the excitement of emancipation as Babe is 
gradually enabled to break the boundaries which keep him positioned as 
meat, finally crossing the privileged threshold of the house from which 
he has been so pointedly excluded to watch television with the farmer 
and Babe's surrogate dog mother Fly.   
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What I found particularly illuminating here was the exposure of the 
levels of hierarchy among animals created by human colonisation in the 
small human empire of the farm, an empire which makes concrete human 
desire and human will in its social relations and its rational design of the 
earth and of the animals themselves. The film displays the key role of 
these boundaries of exclusion and levels of hierarchy among animals in 
maintaining the practices of meat and the non-subject status of the meat 
animal.  The dogs, in the canine equivalent of human chauvinism, 
attribute their privilege with some complacency to their greater 
intelligence, but that facile fabrication is disrupted for us nicely by 
Babe's pig intelligence in some of the film's earliest scenes.  What is 
exposed as unstable, duplicitous and oppressive here is the conventional 
boundary and contract on which the relatively privileged status of the pet 
and 'house' animal is based, which bears on the privileged status of dogs 
and cats in Western society.  
 
Because it reveals the conventionality and instability of the 
considerability hierarchy among animals, the film provides us with the 
materials to reconstruct the Contract or political origin story for the 
privileged group of 'pets' or personal companion animals. In early times, 
hunting, farming and shepherding man ('the Boss') in certain societies 
made a contract with certain wolves: the contract was that they would be 
given a respected role and position very different from that of other 
animals, that they would never be meat, in return for help with a critical 
task.  That task was their active help in the oppression and imprisonment 
of other animals, whom they would, using their more-than-human 
sensory or physical skills, help confine and construct as meat.  In return 
for their help in constructing other animals as meat, not only would they 
themselves never be meat, they would be 'looked after', given a share of 
the meat themselves. Their subjectivity would be recognised, and the 
reductive Cartesian conception would never apply to them.  The working 
animal might often be a 'familiar', like the sheepdogs in Babe, the subject 
of a deeply personal relationship, but also accorded the dignity of a co-
worker and acknowledged for their skilful contribution to economic life. 
In the same sense that various human mythic Contracts or founding 
political stories are about dividing the spoils, this was a Contract not 
only about cooperation in economic life but about mutual benefit in 
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meat.  But as the disruptions of Babe neatly demonstrate, inclusion in the 
contract class has nothing to do with 'intelligence', and everything to do 
with complicity. 
 
This Old Contract, originally a cooperative work contract according 
privilege in return for complicity in the practice of meat and the 
domination or elimination of the non-contract animals, is later under the 
Modern Contract extended to the privileged companion animals - the 
pets - with whom so many of us continue to share our lives, but extended 
in a new form. As production moves out of the household at the 
beginning of the modern era, the role of farm-household animals is 
transformed in the new separation of public/private in much the same 
way as the role of women.  Both the working farm wife and the working 
farm animal now become subject to the modernist polarity that construes 
'rational' economic relationships in alienated, masculinist and narrowly 
instrumental terms as hyperseparated from moral and  affective familiar 
relationships, and affective relationships as occurring in a highly 
circumscribed 'private' sphere of altruism supposedly untainted by 
economic considerations.  The 'familiar' working animal of the contract 
class is replaced by the bourgeois 'pet' who, like the bourgeois wife, 
leads a sheltered life in a protected private household.12 
 
The hyperseparation between the 'pet' animal and the 'meat' animal is 
intensified as the meat animal becomes subject to the rationally 
instrumentalised mass-production regime of the factory farm or 
laboratory.  The 'familiar' animal disappears, and the complementary 
polarity of the subjectivised and underemployed 'pet' animal and the 
reduced and instrumentalised 'meat' animal takes its place. As Babe 
reminds us, the 'familiar' working animal could integrate reason and 
emotion, economic and affective, public and private, elements and 
exemplify animal skill, difference and mystery.13  In the Old Contract 
relationship (at its best), 'familiars' were skilful and respected co-
workers, whose economic role was based on their difference from the 
human and their consequent ability to extend human senses and human 
powers; in the Modern Contract relationship (at its worst), the pet is a 
servile toy or dependent lacking both autonomy and mystery, often 
conceived in humanised terms as a childlike or inferior self, and for such 
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structural reasons increasingly marginal to human lives.14  These are of 
course the extremes of a possible continuum, but one that in practice 
tends to be configured in response to the political forces underlying the 
Old and Modern Contracts.  If the pet and the meat tend now to 
monopolise the roles these forces have left open, what has disappeared is 
the possibility of the animal 'familiars' Babe reimagines for us - the same 
animals integrated into our economic as into our affective lives, and at 
the same time the possibility of a less alienated form of economic life 
which integrates not only the real but the symbolic animal in the form of 
affective creativity. 
 
For urban dwellers, which is, increasingly, most of us, animals of the 
Modern Contract class of pets usually now represent our main contact 
with the animal world.  This is unfortunate, because the Modern Contract 
defines the pet in opposition to the meat animal and reflects and repeats 
many of the duplicities, denials and exclusions  involved in the 
surrounding western institution of meat.  The exclusionary form of the 
original contract of complicity in meat is retained and intensified in the 
Modern Contract with the pet, usually a carnivore whom the owner  
continues to feed on the flesh of other 'meat' animals.  The malevolent cat 
in Babe is seen thus profiting from the death of the Christmas duck 
Rosanna;  in real life, non-privileged animals assigned to the 'meat' side 
of this dualistic hierarchy die to make meat for the pets of people who 
think of themselves unproblematically as animal lovers - kangaroos, 
dolphins, penguins, anonymous and rare marine animals in yearly 
billions are slaughtered at some remove to feed the cats and dogs whose 
own deaths as meat would be unthinkable to their owners.    
 
If the 'pet' is defined in terms of the same Modern Contract that defines 
the 'meat' animal, we can understand as complementary constructions the 
strongly dualistic boundaries of the 'pet' and 'meat' animal; the pet animal 
is a communicative and ethical subject, ideally subject to consideration 
and fit for human companionship, the meat animal is none of these 
things.  If the pet and the meat are complementary polarised aspects of 
the same contract, it is this tainted and hidden relationship that enables 
our simultaneous claim to love some animals and to have a right to 
ruthlessly exploit other animals who are not very different, to 
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simultaneously admit pet subjectivity and ignore or deny meat-animal 
subjectivity.  The Old Contract dignified the role of contract animals, but 
presupposed an instrumental relationship to other animals, and this 
division becomes a pet/meat dualism in the contract of the modern era. 
This genealogy does much to explain the extraordinary contradictions 
involved in our contemporary treatment of animals and our claims to 
love and respect animals.  For example, it is these dualistic contracts that 
'animal lovers' honour when they, perhaps even sometimes as vegetarians 
or vegans themselves, bring into existence and even breed carnivorous 
pet animals whom they feed on the 'meat' of other animals;  or whom pet 
lovers irresponsibly introduce to inappropriate environments where they 
are permitted to make other animals meat and to disrupt carefully 
balanced and negotiated communities of free-living animals.  The 
dualism of the Modern Contract forms the background to such abuses as 
the dumping of domestic cats in the wild by 'animal lovers', to become a 
menace to indigenous animals in contexts like Australia where there are 
few checks and balances.  
 
The moral dualism of both the Old and the Modern Contract helps 
construct the taboo against recognising the subjectivity of the meat 
animal, as well as the general failure to recognise animal subjectivity, 
and produces the moral evasions of meat, especially factory-farmed meat.  
Most modern urban dwellers have had some positive experiences with 
animals such as dogs or cats, have at some time allowed themselves to 
experience them as narrative and communicative subjects rather than as 
Cartesian 'machine-animals' or as mindless bodies.  But the ethical 
dualism and impermeability of this contract boundary prevents them 
transferring this awareness to other animals considered 'meat animals' or 
to wild animals, reflected in the contradiction of the animal lover's horror 
taboo against eating dogs and contrasting indifference or complacency 
about the horrific treatment of the 'meat animal'.  The recognition drama 
of Babe takes us some distance then towards pushing over this key 
barrier to a better consciousness of the moral and ecological status of all 
animals, showing us how Babe is excluded from contract status as meat, 
and how both Babe and the sheep are oppressed by the contract and by 
the privilege of the dogs and cats.  
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But in another crucial way the film fails to resolve some key ambiguities 
surrounding the contract.  For we can also read Babe's liberation in the 
end of the film as his joining or displacing the dogs in the contract, 
recasting him  in the role of non-violent communicator with the rest of 
the farm animals. Is Babe's liberation then to be set within the Old 
Contract's complicity in the oppression of non-contract animals, and the 
Modern Contract's dualism of the meat and the pet?  Is it merely the 
correction of a mistaken individual placement in the hierarchical species 
order of rational meritocracy the contracts preserve? Or does it open up a 
new possibility: that Babe's liberation can somehow be extended to all 
other animals?  To the extent that it is an exclusionary contract, in which 
some make a living by complicity in instrumentalising, imprisoning and 
oppressing others, the contract cannot be extended to provide liberation 
for all.  The attempt to use such a contract as a basis for liberation only 
succeeds in re-erecting the barrier of moral dualism in a new place, 
slightly extending the class of persons while leaving the person/property 
dualism unquestioned.   
 
Here we come up against the limits imposed by the liberal understanding 
of liberation as individual salvation and by its occlusion of its key 
underlying dualistic constructions, which applied to the animal sphere 
generates the same problems that various human liberation movements 
encounter with liberalism.  If Babe is to be saved within the limits of 
privilege the contracts define, or because he is included in the category 
of persons in recognition of his newly-discovered resemblance to the 
human and discontinuity from other animals, we can recognise this as the 
same colonising contract some forms of liberal feminism have endorsed, 
to allow the other to survive at the price of bringing them under the sign 
of the Same and to elevate a few through complicity in the oppression of 
others.  Feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for example, argued 
that women should be admitted to the privileged class of political 
rightholders in virtue of their discontinuity with allegedly 'lower groups' 
such as negro slaves, and their similarity to the master group, elite white 
men.  The strategy of extending the category of persons without recasting 
the person/property dualism in which it is constructed is bound to fail as 
an attempt to elevate animals, for exactly the same reasons that similar 
liberal feminist strategies were/are bound to fail. The door opens to admit 
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a few, but closes to keep the rest outside where they were.  One boundary 
of moral dualism is momentarily penetrated, but the rest remain in place 
or new ones are constructed.   So the film apparently displays Babe's 
liberation, but leaves us with the big questions about whether Babe will 
be admitted alone, with all other pigs, with some other pigs, with all 
other animals, or with everything we might consider food?  
 
An anti-anthrocentric culture would, I think, need to reject the colonising 
aspects of the Old Contract Babe shows us, in which 'the Boss' 
undertakes to allow familiars the meat of other animals that are treated as 
beneath moral consideration.  But it would need to reject too the Modern 
Contract in which 'pet' and 'meat' animals are defined in dualistic terms 
as hyper-separated and complementary animal categories, with the hyper-
subjectivised and emotionally-invested 'pet' privileged over the 
undersubjectivised and emotionally-divested 'meat'.  Pet/meat dualism 
resembles male/female dualism in its complex relationships and 
interconnection with other dualisms; thus pet/meat dualism is closely 
associated with and draws on several of the major dualisms that define 
the economic life of liberal modernity, such as public/private, 
reason/emotion, urban/rural and person/property, and there are strong 
resonances with race and gender dualisms for these as well as other 
reasons.15  Pet/meat dualism may be seen as a special case of the larger 
liberal person/property dualism, in which the pet is treated as a de facto 
person, marginally recognised in law, and the meat animal is included in 
the larger category of animal economic property.  
 
Feminists have argued that a proper understanding of liberalism requires 
an understanding of its gendered dimensions in connecting the 
public/private, reason/emotion and male/female dualisms16; it might 
equally be said that understanding liberalism requires an understanding 
of its animal dimensions, in connecting the human/animal, pet/meat 
person/property, public/private, and reason/emotion dualisms.  We have 
already noticed in part 3 that there is a radical kind of inequality and a-
reciprocity in modern commodity practices of meat that is often not 
present in the society of the hunter-gatherer, where carnivorous practices 
could express not so much superiority to animals as human inclusion 
within a common human-animal realm of reciprocal predation and life-
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exchange.  So marked is this that 'meat' can be said to have a different 
meaning in each of these political contexts. An important implication for 
theory of both these sets of observations is that to understand our 
contemporary patterns of relationship with animals we need a more 
clearly socially and especially politically nuanced and situated analysis 
of these categories than is achievable within the confines of an animal 
ethics framework.  That is why I have used the term 'animal justice' 
instead of the terms 'animal rights' or 'animal defence'.  
 
Moving beyond the contracts17 does not imply that we have to forgo all 
systematic association with animals, but rather that we have be prepared 
to consider carefully the politics of human/animal relationships and test 
them against the criterion of realisation in a society where none are 
morally excluded and made available for the horrors of the gulag.  But if 
the concept of the 'pet' is tainted by the same contract and public/private 
duality that defines the 'meat', where do we start?  I think that the attempt 
to negotiate a new communicative model of relationship with animals 
could do worse than start from the concept of the 'familiar' Babe  makes 
visible again, because the 'familiar' relationship escapes some of the 
rigidity of the pet/meat dualism; thus the relationship with the working 
animal was often strongly communicative, built on a respect for animal 
difference, and unified rather than split the rational-economic and 
emotional connection with the animal.  Your new familiar could be an 
animal with whom you form some kind of communicative bond, 
friendship, protective relationship, companion-ship, or acquaintance. The 
familiar may, if you are very lucky, be a wild free-living animal in your 
local surroundings you see sufficiently often to come to know 
individually. Relationships with local lizards, birds, and occasionally 
friendly mammals like wombats, are examples. Or they may be a 
domesticated or semi-domesticated animal with whom you have 
economic as well as affective relations not dependent on the moral 
exclusion of other animals.  These possibilities start to become available 
to us once we begin to see beyond the dualisms that underpin the 
contracts.  
 
An attempt to rework the 'familiar' relationship for a new time must 
clearly reject the familiar's traditionally oppressive roles in relation to 
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other animals.  But many of the domestic animals who suffered under the 
contracts, hens, ducks and geese for example, thrive as human familiars 
and can live with us in ways that enable the formation of communicative 
relationships, mutual enjoyment, and exploration - without requiring a 
further class of excluded animals who exist instrumentally to provide 
them with meat.18  We have to ensure that we take responsibility for any 
harm our familiars may do to ecological communities or to communities 
of free-living animals, whose welfare I believe should, in the event of 
conflict, take priority over our desire for animal companions, and in 
many if not most contexts this must mean abandoning the fostering of 
dogs and cats.  Combining this new/old kind of 'familiar' personal and 
moral relationship with animals with an economic relationship, as Babe  
imagines, is challenging, to say the least, and involves negotiating so 
many difficult tensions that it must ultimately lead towards a major 
revisioning and restructuring of economic life.  But the potential rewards 
are great, and such a strategy also indicates routes towards breaking 
down those key contemporary versions of reason/emotion and 
public/private dualism that help construct the linked forms of alienation 
involved in the human workplace and the animal gulag.  To the extent 
that Babe helps us reimagine the animal as potential familiar rather than 
as pet or as meat,  it offers us a glimpse of an overgrown but still 
discernible path which could begin our journey towards a non-oppressive 
form of the mixed community and a livable future respectfully shared 
with animals.  
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ETHICS, CONFLICT AND ANIMAL RESEARCH 
 
Andrew Brennan 
 
Introduction 
 
The three Rs of Russell and Burch - Reduce, Replace, Refine - are 
widely agreed maxims of animal-based science.  The morally-concerned 
researcher tries to reduce  both the number of animals used in science, 
and the impacts of procedures on them.  Animals are to be replaced, 
wherever possible, by techniques that do not use animals. Techniques 
and procedures are to be refined as much as possible to minimise harms.   
Implementing these maxims is desirable given that much animal-based 
science seeks to promote knowledge through the deliberate and 
intentional infliction of harms on other living things, often for the sake of 
studying these harms themselves.   
 
When we try to engage in moral discussion about which pieces of 
research using animals should or should not be permitted, we run up 
against significant problems.  In this article, I identify three areas where 
doubts are specially acute, and suggest that these can be thought of as the 
three Cs of animal experimentation ethics. The three Cs are not maxims, 
however. Instead, they indicate areas of difficulty and uncertainty that 
have to be negotiated before conclusions can be reached. The three Cs, I 
argue, should be taken together with three other dimensions of moral 
thinking - details, intuitions and principles.  When all these dimensions 
are plotted, the result is a space of moral argument and perplexity.  By 
drawing attention to some features of this space, I am able in the present 
article to indicate hidden weaknesses in the present systems for 
regulating animal research.  
 
Reason, feeling and ethics 
 
By intuition  is meant the sense or feeling we get in a situation that things 
are, morally speaking, right or wrong. We often express this sense of 
moral rightness or wrongness even when we cannot give a very specific, 
reasoned account of why we have the feeling.  But ethics is not just a 
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matter of feelings.  We all recognize the existence of moral rules or 
principles, some of which can be rationally justified.  Some of the Ten 
Commandments of Christianity, or the rule that we should behave 
towards others as we would expect them to behave towards us, are rules 
that many people would accept as guides for action.  When we give 
reasons for why an action is right or wrong, we may cite one of these 
general guiding principles. 
 
How are the two ingredients, reason and feeling, principles and 
intuitions, to be combined?  One project of moral theory is to see if a set 
of principles can be found which gives a rational justification for our 
moral feelings. The general idea of this project is that it should be 
possible to put the two ingredients into balance with each other. If a 
principle (e.g. ‘Always tell the truth’) leads to behaviour that does not 
feel morally right, then the principle has to be modified. Conversely, if 
our intuitions are out of keeping with a widely-agreed principle, then we 
can try to educate our intuitions so they harmonize with the principle. In 
the jargon of theorists, this self-conscious balancing act is an attempt to 
find a reflective equilibrium between principles and intuitions.1  
 
For many scientists, the introduction of feelings, or a sense of right and 
wrong, into discussions is uncomfortable. With the exception of some 
parts of psychology, feelings are not normally the object of scientific 
study and the ‘official’ methodology of scientific investigation leaves 
little - if any - room for emotions. The scientist is supposed to deal with 
theory and evidence in a rational, objective manner, unmoved by 
passions. The supposition is seldom confirmed in real life. In discussions 
about controversial areas of work, natural scientists become just as 
vehement as anyone else. But, despite this, they may at other times try to 
dismiss ‘emotive language’, as if matters of right and wrong, duty and 
integrity, are not connected with feelings in any way. Modern moral 
philosophy shares a part of the scientists’ attitudes here. It does not rule 
out the importance of feelings to morality. But it encourages rational, and 
impartial, reflection on how feelings can be harmonized with principles. 
Moral theory sometimes asks us to step aside from our passionate 
commitments, enthusiasms and deeply felt convictions in order to reflect 
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on the extent to which they can be brought into conformity with 
rationally-justifiable principles. 
 
The quest for reflective equilibrium is not always successful. Even when 
a balance is found, this is not the end of moral debate. People who share 
the same intuitions and principles can still give different judgments on 
the same case. For example, a researcher and an anti-vivisectionist may 
share the same moral point of view. One of them, however, believes that 
the consciousness and sensation of a certain non-human species is very 
close to that of humans. The other does not believe this at all. Let us call 
this a disagreement about the details of the case. The term ‘details’ is 
used loosely here to cover matters of belief, opinion, probability, theory 
and speculation, as well as the known and agreed facts of a situation. In 
this sense of the term, many of the sources of argument about animal 
research are concerned with the details. Notice that different opinions 
about what the details of a case are will often result in different moral 
evaluations. 
 
There are thus at least three dimensions to be explored in moral 
discussions: details, intuitions and principles. (Buning et al.2 refer to 
‘facts’ where I have talked about the ‘details’ of a case).  Being aware of 
these can be of practical help in resolving disagreements.  Often, the 
stumbling block is a question of fact, theory or opinion not of values or 
ethics. For example, I recall one occasion in which an experimentation 
ethics committee was uncertain about approving a project involving the 
study of a particular frog species found only in one habitat in Australia.   
As part of the research a number of the animals were to be removed from 
their environment for laboratory study. After some discussion, it became 
clear that the major issues in the minds of those with worries about the 
project were two: the relative abundance of the frogs, and the impact of 
the investigation on the rest of the habitat. Once these details  had been 
identified, it became relatively easy to establish parameters under which 
the project would be able to qualify for approval. 
 
Not all issues can be settled so smoothly. In particular, there will be 
opportunities for endless conflict on matters of detail which are 
themselves the subject of different opinions and theories - for example 
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the intelligence of birds, or primates, in relation to humans, or the 
claimed benefits of research. Principles and intuitions also collide in 
fascinating and complex ways. But it would be wrong to think that 
contest is the only problem to be encountered in discussions of ethics.   
There are three Cs central to ethics -  contest, context and complexity.    
Each one of these deserves separate description. 
 
Contest 
 
It is apparent that ethical issues are often contested and some of the 
problems by which we are most puzzled have no agreed moral answer.  
This is obviously true of the debates about euthanasia, abortion or 
screening for genetic diseases. It is not just the factual or theoretical 
details that are disputed in these cases. Instead there is often a debate 
between fundamental ethical orientations or principles. In the case of 
research involving animals this contest is widely recognized. Nearly 
everyone agrees on some of the factual and theoretical details, for 
example, that many of the animals used by researchers have a degree of 
consciousness and the capacity for pain and pleasure. When Tom Regan 
writes that animals are subjects of a life, many laboratory scientists 
would agree. And when Peter Singer points to the existence of animal 
suffering we can all think of cases where this has happened.3  So, what is 
it that divides Regan and Singer from those who support the continued 
use of animals in research?    
 
At present, the argument between supporters and opponents of animal 
research seems mainly centred on specific details (matters of fact and 
theory). Thereafter, there is a second layer of disagreement about the 
ethical stance that is appropriate in the light of the facts. As to details, 
there are observations and speculations about the degree of similarity 
between human and animal consciousness, sensations and lifestyles. On 
the ethical side, there is contest over whether, for example, it is 
legitimate to inflict avoidable harms on members of one species in order 
to secure a benefit to members of another. To disentangle the factual, 
intuitive and principled issues at stake is a large task and lies beyond the 
focus of the present article.  However, what is said later about levels of 
concern draws attention to one of the forgotten areas in this debate. 
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Context 
 
Some of the sciences, for example, chemistry and physics, aim to identify 
and understand fundamental mechanisms which operate in the same way 
in all contexts. The laws in these sciences are global - even universal (in 
its literal sense) - in scope. To the extent that they succeed in describing 
the universe, they have to be mutually consistent. By contrast, social life 
for human beings is not subject to universal unchanging laws. As soon as 
we specify a possible principle of conduct, we can think of a context 
where it seems not to apply or to be in conflict with some other precept. 
For example, suppose we accept the following maxims: first, that we 
should be truthful with each other; second, that we should avoid 
unnecessary harms to another agent.  It is not hard to think of a situation 
where telling the truth may do more harm than staying silent. So, the two 
precepts come into conflict. So, should we try to live in keeping with just 
a single principle? This would be a bad idea for many reasons. In any 
case, it does not solve the present problem.  Even if we limited ourselves 
to the principle of avoiding harm, we encounter conflicts. Consider, for 
example, a case where doing harm to one agent prevents a greater harm 
to another. It looks as if it might be impossible to live strictly in keeping 
with even one principle. For this reason, moral precepts are not to be 
regarded as strict and exceptionless. Instead, they always have to be 
interpreted according to the specific case we are dealing with and the 
context in which we find ourselves. 
 
How does context, the second of the three Cs, affect animal research?   
Many laboratory procedures are more or less routine, for example those 
involved in antibody production, blood sampling, anaesthesia or 
euthanasia. However even in these cases, there are often choices about 
where to draw the blood from, or which adjuvant to use to stimulate the 
antibody response. Since any of these procedures involve a cost to the 
animal, it has to be asked whether there is a real need for this procedure 
at all in the context of the overall research program. 
 
Contextual issues associated with these routine activities are regularly 
discussed in institutional ethics committees. Not all countries have such 
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watchdog bodies, but in Australia, for example, where an animal ethics 
committee system is well-established,4 questions about the context of 
procedures are standard fare in discussion of whether to approve a 
particular proposal. Committees consider in detail whether a given 
procedure, taking place in a particular project, is justified in light of the 
aims of the project, the potential benefits, and the skills of the 
researchers. These are not the only contextual issues. Others may include 
how often the procedure is to be used, or the maximum exposure of any 
given animal to a particular imposition.   
 
It should be noticed that laying down standard operating procedures does 
not preclude a consideration of contextual issues. Any standard protocol 
for bleeding, pain relief or anaesthesia has to allow for exceptions.  For 
example, in Australia, ether is no longer regarded as a generally 
appropriate anaesthetic agent for small animals. Experience has shown, 
however, that for some applications it remains the anaesthetic of choice 
provided it is used with care in a situation where appropriate precautions 
are taken. Decisions on when to approve the use of ether are inevitably 
context-dependent. 
 
Complexity 
 
The third 'C' is complexity.  Actions and decisions are seldom simple: as 
the point of view from which we describe something changes we become 
aware of this. Lunging at someone with a dagger can at the same time be 
assassinating an emperor and starting a revolution.    These three 
descriptions of essentially the same physical act draw attention to the 
layers of complexity inherent in it. Until we have thought about what we 
do from more than one standpoint, we can easily convince ourselves that 
our actions are simpler than they are. Consider a case where a tiny pump 
has to be installed under the skin of a rat.To suture the wound tightly can 
ensure that the pump does not become dislodged. But it can also cause 
extra post-operative discomfort; by focusing only on getting the sutures 
tight enough the researchers may overlook the other aspects of what they 
are doing. When they recognize that getting the sutures tight may not be 
getting them right then they have started to think about the other aspects 
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of what they are doing outside the province of science and the aims of 
the research they are engaged in.   
 
Complexity refers to the capacity for a situation to be multi-layered.   
From one point of view, implanting the pump securely is central to 
getting the science done. A different layer of considerations is concerned 
with the welfare and comfort of the animals. Focusing on one layer to the 
exclusion of others is fundamental to many conflict situations. Members 
of ethics committee who have a background in animal care and advocacy 
will - from the point of view of researchers - sometimes seem to ignore 
the significance and excitement of the science.   From an outsider’s point 
of view, the scientists can seem peculiarly indifferent to the pain or 
discomfort of their animals, since their focus is on the demands of the 
research and the interest of the results they are achieving. The layer on 
which we focus in discussing a case often reflects our own interests. To 
grasp the situation in its complexity will often require us to pay attention 
to levels and layers that have not previously come to our attention. 
 
Problems of levels and layers are not the same as those of context. We 
can see this by focusing on just one context, say the housing 
requirements for a specific group of experimental animals. Here there 
will typically be different attitudes taken by investigators and animal care 
staff. The researchers will normally concentrate largely on the health 
status of the animals, ease of access, freedom from infection during any 
healing process that is to occur and other matters that are central to the 
smooth operation of their research. By contrast, care staff will often be 
more aware of lighting levels, environmental enrichment, the suitability 
of bedding materials and requirements for play and companionship. So 
there are at least these two layers of complexity in such a case. 
 
The two perspectives are often complementary. Adopting both provides 
us with a richer understanding of the situation of the animals, care staff 
and investigators. Sometimes, however, the demands of one perspective 
will be in conflict with the demands of another. Loose bedding, for 
example, may be desirable for the species in question, but interfere with 
the results being studied. A case like this may sometimes pose a priority 
question: which perspective is to be given authority? In a real situation, 
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the complexity of the issue would not normally be exhausted by 
considering only two perspectives. Other layers to be remembered would 
include the nature of the proposed research, its position in a larger 
intellectual framework, the career interests of investigators and care staff, 
and so on. Philosophers sometimes distinguish ‘thick’ from ‘thin’ 
understandings of people and situations. Focusing on just one layer or 
one dimension of a situation gives us a thin account of it.    Recognizing 
the existence of complexity is to recognize that any research situation is a 
‘thick’ one in this sense. 
 
The problems of ethics 
 
Once the three Cs are recognized, it is easy to see that they will interact 
with details, intuitions and principles to define an area of ethical 
bewilderment and fascination.  For example, we may encounter 
disagreement not only about the appropriate anaesthetic to use in a 
particular procedure (a contextual issue) but also about the relevance of 
the procedure to testing the hypothesis under consideration (which arises 
from thinking about another dimension of a complex situation).  
Likewise, two people may agree in principle that a certain procedure is 
ethically acceptable; they may still disagree over the issue of whether it 
is right to use the procedure in a teaching demonstration as well as in a 
piece of research. This latter, contextual disagreement will be a further 
difference of principle.    
 
As already emphasized there are no exceptionless moral principles.  In 
this way, ethics is more like toxicology than chemistry. But it lacks even 
the regularities found in toxicology. Moral precepts are general guides to 
action.  But the most difficult moral problems come up either in 
particular situations or in specific classes of case (e.g., abortion, 
euthanasia, genetic screening, antibody production).  As we add detail to 
the cases under review, we develop two things simultaneously. First, 
context becomes more clear, and the various dimensions of complexity in 
the situation start to be revealed.  But, second, this often opens the way 
to further conflict involving facts, intuitions and principles. 
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Luckily, there are many situations in which the right course of action is 
clear, and the addition of further details makes no difference to the 
verdict.  So there are many occasions where, for example, we recognize 
that it is right to do some harm to achieve some good (for example, 
pushing someone out of the path of a life-threatening danger).  But the 
scientific use of animals is an excellent exemplar of how agreement on 
principles does not systematically  translate to agreement on cases. 
 
Same question - different aspects 
 
As we uncover a situation in more detail, the scope for ethical 
disagreement can increase. In this section I want to draw attention to two 
different ways we can think about one general issue: the scale of animal-
based research.  In a previous paper5 I used existing sources in the 
literature together with estimates supplied by Mark Matfield and Andrew 
Rowan to arrive at the following estimate of scientific uses of animals: 
 
 United States       22 million   (1986) 
 European Union     11.8 million  (1991) 
 Canada      2.1 million (1993) 
 Switzerland      0.86 million (1992) 
 Australia      0.75 million  (1989) 
 Japan      2.5 million 
 
 Rest of the world     10  million  (estimate) 
 
This gives a total world animal use in research for the early 1990s of 
around 50 million - or, allowing for discrepancies and underestimates in 
returns, perhaps 55 to 60 million. Notice that some writers would argue 
that a more accurate estimate would be double this figure. If we related 
these numbers to populations, we find significant variations among 
countries. For example, in most of the industrial world, animals used in 
research per million population varies between an upper value of around 
120,000 (the United States) and a lower value of around 14,000 (Spain).5  
Again, within countries there are divergences in the distribution of 
animal use among commercial, government and university laboratories. 
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A noteworthy fact is that in nearly all countries for which there exists 
reasonable data, it appears that animal use in science has declined very 
significantly since 1970, when - again on conservative estimates - total 
world usage was probably around 110 - 120 million. Let us assume that 
the fewer animals used in research the better. It follows that the situation 
by 1990 seems to be much better than the situation in 1970.   But this is 
only one aspect of the question we started with: the scale of animal use in 
science. 
 
To see this issue from a different perspective, consider the following data 
drawn from Nicoll and Russell.6 This time, we are considering all forms 
of animal use in the United States: 
 
 Numbers of Animals Used Annually in the United States 
         Percentage of total 
 
Food 6 086 000 000 96.5% 
Hunting 165 000 000 2.6% 
Killed in animal shelters 27 000 000 .4% 
Fur industry 11 000 000 .2% 
All teaching and research 20 000 000 .3% 
 
The US Department of Agriculture figures show that Nicoll and Russell 
appear to have taken no account of animal slaughter for food apart from 
chickens.7    
 
The figures in other categories are no more reliable than those in the first 
row. The figure for teaching and research is likely an underestimate, and 
the deaths in shelters have been extrapolated from a very small and 
untypical data set and so are entirely unreliable.   Despite these 
drawbacks, the figures can be the basis of some generalization. 
Extrapolation would suggest that in global terms the scientific use of 
animals represents no more than .25% of total animal killing by human 
beings. In fact, if we take into account further impacts such as fishing, 
land clearance and so on then .25% will grossly overestimate the 
contribution of teaching and research to animal suffering and death. 
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These new figures provide a different view on the original question:  the 
scale of animal research. Animals used in research count for a minute 
fraction of human impacts on animals. Their total elimination from 
science would have virtually no effect at all on human-induced suffering 
and death in the animal world. The fact that such animal use has declined 
by 50% over the last twenty five years would now - for some people - 
hardly seem significant at all. Looking at the data from this new point of 
view, the same people might ask why research involving animals is so 
heavily-regulated and widely-debated. Others (including myself) may 
claim that the allocation of significant resources in this area reveals that 
animal use in the sciences poses ethical questions of a different sort from 
those posed by other impacts on animal lives. I have written on this 
matter in other papers, and will not follow it further here. 
 
What I have tried to show in the present section is that considering the 
numbers of animals used in research is not a simple matter. Rather, there 
are layers of complexity associated with this question. Depending on 
how we locate the issue of numbers, we may be tempted to adopt 
different perspectives, which themselves can give rise to new questions 
of detail, intuition and principle. An animal protectionist may emphasise 
the enormous scale of a world industry dedicated to harming animals for 
the sake of some dubious human benefits. An animal scientist may 
respond by indicating how tiny the proportion of animals harmed in 
research is: more than 250 battery chickens are killed for every animal 
which dies in the cause of science. Each side has a truth of sorts on its 
side. But, until each takes note of the perspective of the other, their 
engagement with the situation remains, at best, partial.            .
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Levels of concern 
 
The complexity of life is such that we can often become so engrossed in 
thinking about only one aspect of a situation that we miss other aspects 
of it. There are many other ways to think about the scale of animal 
research apart from the two given in the previous section. And there are 
many different ways to think about specific pieces of research as well.   
In this section, I develop the idea of complexity further in order to draw 
attention to a hidden area in the animals debate.  Once this is brought to 
light, it becomes obvious that present methods of regulating animal 
research are inadequate. It follows from what I argue that there is no 
place in which certain issues of fundamental importance can be debated. 
The only people with an influence on these matters are the animal-using 
scientists themselves.  To a certain extent, then, scientific animal use is 
running free from social control and proper ethical scrutiny. 
 
To identify the hidden area, let us put ourselves in the place of a 
researcher. Suppose I am committed to a worthwhile research program 
carried out to the highest standards. One day, I start to think about the 
large number of other programs which failed to get funding at the time 
my own one was funded. I follow this up by considering whether the 
proportion of the research dollar going to the sort of work I am engaged 
in is being well spent in comparison to how it might have been spent (say 
in epidemiological or public health research, or in preventive medicine 
programs). I have a nagging doubt that something is wrong: might it not 
be better if the money being spent on my research were going to some 
other program? 
 
Notice where this chain of thought goes. It does not move immediately to 
the conclusion that there might be anything inherently wrong in what I 
am doing. In terms of the standards in my area, the research I undertake 
is of high merit, let us suppose. The ethics committee in my institution 
actually regards me as a model scientist, and I have pioneered some 
novel forms of environmental enrichment for the animals I work with. So 
there are no ethical problems about laboratory practice, the integrity of 
the research team, the standards of animal care, and so on.  Notice that it 
was not from this point of view that my concerns arose.  They involved 
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larger questions about how society is using its resources, and the 
direction that scientific research is taking. Suddenly, I reflect that this 
situation is no different from many others in which people find 
themselves. For instance, a police officer who would like to see certain 
drugs decriminalized may still work effectively and ethically as a 
member of a drug team enforcing the very laws that she would prefer to 
see changed. This looks like a similar case. The officer does everything 
right, even when there is a question hanging over whether the laws the 
officer is enforcing are themselves right. The very same behaviour which 
is right, from one perspective, is also seen as wrong from a different one. 
 
The thought experiment has illuminated an important possibility.  It may 
not be right that certain research is taking place, even when the 
researcher carrying it out is doing everything right! Any air of paradox 
about this evaporates once we see that actions are complex and can be 
viewed from more than one perspective. The second kind of rightness is 
concerned with the behaviour of the researcher, and the quality of the 
research. This is the sort of rightness which is monitored and policed in 
Australia by the animal ethics committees within institutions. These 
committees have to include members of animal protection and advocacy 
groups (as required by the national Code of Practice). As a consequence, 
approval of research projects and housing standards is subject to 
particularly tough scrutiny by people who may be in principle opposed to 
all research on live animals.  However, these people have no input to 
deciding on the first kind of rightness.  More accurately, they do not have 
input to this through their membership of institutional ethics committees. 
 
How can we start to think about the ethics of animal use away from the 
institutional perspective?  Any of a hundred examples would do, and I 
consider, for vividness, just one. For some parts of diabetes research, a 
widely-used animal model is the streptozotocin rat. Rats injected with 
streptozotocin suffer damage to the pancreas which induces diabetes.   At 
different research centres, these damaged animals are studied for the light 
they can shed on glycogen synthesis or other biochemical phenomena 
which may advance the understanding and management of diabetes in 
humans.   
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At the institutional level, ethics committees have to be aware of the 
special problems associated with streptozotocin (it is an unstable and 
dangerous substance), the special care needs of the affected animals and 
the need for research involving such high impositions on the animals to 
be of the best quality as judged by international standards. It is at this 
level of concern that the input from animal advocacy groups is mandated 
in Australia and some other countries. Where there is doubt about a 
specific research proposal, committees may rely on external referees to 
assure them of the competence of the investigator and the significance of 
the work. What is important to recognize, however, is that these 
institutional-level concerns do not give a complete answer to the 
question: ‘Is it right to undertake this piece of research?’ 
 
Here are some questions which cannot be adequately addressed as long 
as the focus is on the institutional setting:    
(1) How successful has this general line of research been in 
illuminating mechanisms, or stimulating new approaches to treatment 
and management of human diabetes?    
This question is, at best, only partially addressed at institutional level, 
and has by and large to be left to the judgment of the scientific 
community and funding bodies. The peer-review mechanism of national 
grant-awarding bodies does not normally provide for lay input or for any 
form of independent ethical scrutiny.    
(2) To what extent are animal-based studies proving currently 
productive for the general understanding of the relevant human 
biochemistry?   
This can be answered, if at all, only by considering the field of 
biochemistry as a whole at a given time. National strategy committees, or 
review sessions at international conferences, would be appropriate places 
for an explicit discussion of this topic. These normally have no animal 
protectionist input, or independent ethical scrutiny. If national or 
international review impinges on discussion at institutional level it will 
only be via the expert judgment of researchers and referees. At 
institutional levels, it has to be taken on trust that programs which 
qualify for competitive funding will be productive given the current 
directions in biochemical research. In summary, it seems that only 
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scientists themselves will ever give consideration to, and attempt answers 
for, this question. 
(3) What is the appropriate weight to be given to research on diabetes 
(including the rat model) compared with research on other human health 
problems?    
This third query is of the same kind that was put by the investigator in 
our thought experiment given above. It is only one of indefinitely many 
comparative questions which raise matters that can only be understood in 
relation to national and international trends, funding practices, and social 
analysis. Unlike the second question, this one cannot easily be fitted in to 
discussion at specialist  scientific conferences. Like the second one, if 
addressed at all, it is likely to be considered by expert groups without the 
input of lay persons and animal protection advocates. 
 
Conclusion: Arenas of conflict 
 
The previous section raises questions of context and complexity that are 
seldom addressed explicitly in the literature on animal research.  
Philosophers, obsessed with principles and ethical theories, often gloss 
over the details of how moral decisions are reached.  It is much easier to 
say that a practice is wrong than to suggest ways in which it can be made 
better. At the most general theoretical levels, there is a tendency to think 
in terms of exclusive positions: complete abolitionism at one side, and 
freedom for science on the other. Debates between such extremes are 
generally sterile, however inspirational their ideals.   Institutions, caught 
in the middle, have set up committees and adopted national standards in 
an attempt to find a way forward that respects some of the demands of 
science on the one hand and the case for animals on the other.  What I 
have argued above is that this is not enough.  The ethical scrutiny of 
scientific animal use inevitably raises questions that cannot be settled 
within the institutional context. 
 
In his address to the 10th annual Summit for the Animals on April 7, 
1995, in St. Louis, United States, Merritt Clifton (editor of Animal 
People) urged the animal protection groups to become a ‘loyal 
opposition’ to science. In a parliamentary democracy the loyal opposition 
strenuously opposes the government of the day while sharing with it 
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respect for national laws, principles of democracy and due process.  
Australia is fortunate that it already has a loyal opposition, many of 
whose members sit on animal ethics committees. For them, however, the 
experience can be frustrating. Several of the high-level considerations 
that may have informed their resistance to animal research can find no 
expression at the institutional committee. When a proposal for research 
into a disease which affects only a small proportion of the population is 
put forward, there is no space for saying that the money would be better 
spent on tackling the health problems of Aboriginal communities. This is 
not an issue for a scientific establishment, like a university, to decide. 
Indeed, the funds for which the researcher is applying may well not be 
available for any other purpose.  It follows that only some of the rights 
and wrongs of various pieces of research can be debated at the 
institutional level. 
 
The establishment of animal ethics committees may give the misleading 
impression that the only arena of conflict over animals in research is the 
institutional one. It is not, and there is no reason for excluding the loyal 
opposition, and the rest of society, from playing its part in the ethical 
evaluation of science at levels beyond the university and the research 
laboratory.  Most scientists recognize that science is not something above 
the law, and that they have no special authority when it comes to 
assessing the ethical implications of their work. It is surprising, then, that 
so little attention has been given to establishing national committees of 
ethical review, with a broad mandate and a wide  membership. Such 
committees would become part of larger structures of scrutiny which 
would provide some assurance that science and technology is not 
running out of control.  
 
For the purposes of this brief article, I have ignored the standard political 
processes in which animal protection organisations, the media and 
scientific pressure groups already play a part in dealing with contested 
issues. The possibilities for political activity, however, are not limited to 
elections, demonstrations, journalism and lobbying. Given that 
controversy can arise at many levels, the decision to include members of 
the ‘loyal opposition’ in decision-taking at institutional level in no way 
precludes them from having an important role to play at other levels. 
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Being aware that such levels of concern exist is also an incentive for 
establishing structures which can permit societies to explore more of the 
complexity of the problems which worry us. 
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TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO GENE TECHNOLOGY IN 
ANIMALS 
 
Birgitta Forsman 
 
Gene technology on animals has increased enormously in Sweden during 
the 1990s. Most of it has to do with transgenic laboratory animals. 
Before this increase began, there was an official investigation of 
potential ethical problems of animal biotechnology, in which it was said: 
‘We have the possibility to set the limits "from the beginning".’ And it 
also tried to do it. 
 
This investigation was set up in 1989, when the Swedish government 
appointed a Principal Administrative Officer of the Ministry of 
Agriculture to make a so-called one-man investigation about gene 
technology used on animals and plants. A white paper from this 
investigation was published in February 1990 with the title Genteknik – 
växter och djur (Gene technology–plants and animals).1 In the following, 
this white paper is called ‘the first report’. 
 
However, in March 1990, the same government decided to set up a new 
investigation, which was called ‘The Commission on Gene Technology’. 
This was a big, so-called parliamentary commission with several 
politicians and experts in it and led by a retired Vice-Chancellor of a 
prestigious university in Sweden. This commission publicized its white 
paper in September 1992 with the title Genteknik – en utmaning (Gene 
technology–a challenge).2  In the following, this white paper is called 
‘the second report’. 
 
The first investigation was commissioned by the Minister of Agriculture 
and the second by the Minister of Justice.  It is unclear whether there had 
been any contact between the ministers about the issue. The existence of 
the first report is briefly mentioned in the second, but there are no real 
comments on it.  
 
The Commission had a wider objective than the one-man investigation. 
However, the Commission decided in an early stage not to deal with gene 
technology on human beings, with the motivation that this subject had 
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already been treated by an earlier investigation that had published a 
white paper in 1984.  The fact that a white paper on gene technology on 
animals and plants had been published much later, namely ‘the first 
report’, did not prevent the Commission from dealing with the report.  
Whether this is a deliberate shift of policy from the government is 
unclear.  One could easily interpret the creating of the Commission as a 
rejection of the first report, but knowing about the long procedures 
before a Commission is set up I would hardly thing that this is a probable 
explanation.  Rather, the cause seems to have been ignorance about the 
investigation that was already done.  Also, the Principal Administrative 
Officer who made the first investigation was appointed as one of the 
experts on the Commission. 
 
The first report stated several restriction, while the second report was 
rather liberal towards the use of gene technology.  Some examples of 
considerations and suggestions in the first report are these: 
 
–  Gene technology used on animals is discussed mainly from an ethical 
point of view. In contrast, gene technology used on plants and micro 
organisms is discussed from the perspective of potential risks. The 
reason for this distinction of perspectives is that animals have moral 
standing, while plants and micro organisms with these things. have not. 
 
–  Generally, it is said that a Swedish prohibition or moratorium for 
research in gene technology would be both unwise and unrealistic. It 
would affect Sweden very negatively. 
 
–  Animal experiments are examined by ethics committees in Sweden. 
The first report points out that the considerations of these committees are 
limited to aspects concerning the treatment of the animals and the 
question whether the experiment has to be performed on animals. The 
ethics committees do not pay any attention to possible consequences of 
the research, for example if the gene technology research will result in 
products that are not desirable for ethical reasons. The first report says 
that research with gene technology on animals should be reported and 
examined from an ‘extended ethical point of view’. This should be done 
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by a suggested Gene Technology Advisory Board. According to the 
report: 
 
–  Research with gene technology on food-producing animals with the 
goal of increasing the growth or production shall always be disapproved.  
 
–  Research with gene technology on food-producing animals or pets 
shall always be disapproved if a gene from a different species, including 
human beings, is brought into the animal. 
 
–  When animals modified with gene technology are ready to be let out in 
the environment or in production, the advisory ethical decisions will be 
insufficient.  The existing animal ethics committees decide to approve or 
disapprove single applications (or protocols) concerning experiments on 
animals.  However, this decision is only an advice  to the scientist. He 
doesn’t have to follow the decision. He can perform an experiment even 
if the application has been disapproved  What is needed however is a 
binding regulation. 
 
The considerations of the second report are more vague and 
metaphysical. Two questions occur time and again: 
 
(1)  Does nature have an intrinsic value and, if  so, in what sense? 
(2)  Do humans have the right to alter nature and, if so, is there a limit to 
this right? 
 
The second report presents a value basis with the following ingredients: 
 
– The existence of an intrinsic value in nature. 
 
– The Reverence for life principle (taken from Albert Schweitzer, of 
course). 
 
– The doctrine of environmental protection, which means that one should 
‘prevent serious and irreversible disturbances in the fundamental 
functions of natural ecosystems’. 
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– A Kantian view on nonhuman nature, including animals. 
 
– Animal well-being shall be the main basis for the assessment of gene 
technology used on animals. 
 
Some more practical suggestions in the second report were the following: 
 
– It shall be permitted that plants, animals and micro organisms be 
altered for ‘important purposes’. 
 
– It shall be permitted that patents on living matter, including animals, be 
granted. 
 
– It shall be permitted that all kinds of transgenic animals be constructed. 
 
– It shall be permitted that chimeric animals be constructed for research 
purposes. 
 
– No general prohibitions should be included in the law.  
 
Clearly, there is an inconsistency both between the value basis and the 
practical suggestions and internally in the value basis itself. The first 
report draws a line between animals on one side and nature in general on 
the other. In this report, animals are regarded as individuals. In contrast, 
the second report is more ‘holistic’ and regards nature as a whole. The 
second report does not make any distinction between animals and other 
natural objects as potential possessors of moral standing. This confusion 
entails that the suggestions of this report are either vague or inconsistent 
with some items in the chosen value basis. There are also details in some 
statements of the experts in the Commission that simply clash with 
suggestions in the first report. One example is when the theological 
expert of the Commission says that he can see no ethical problems in 
connection with transferring human genes into animals used for food. 
 
One can ask how it can be that two official investigations, set up by the 
same Swedish government, within the period of a couple of years could 
reach such deviating conclusions. And one can ask why this fact has not 
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been regarded and discussed. Why was the first report suddenly 
forgotten, as soon as the Commission had been set up? Why did the 
different ministers of the government and their staff not communicate 
with each other – there are no signs of such a communication? 
 
I have no definite answers to these questions, but there are some possible 
explanations: The commitment of the persons involved varied and was 
also different in direction. The Minister of Agriculture was the one who 
had forced through the bill of the internationally well-known animal 
protection law in 1988. The Principal Administrative Officer, who made 
the first investigation, was a close staff member who had done much of 
the preparatory work for this law.The Ministry of Justice had no 
commitment to animal welfare. They probably regarded it necessary to 
set up a commission for harmonizing the Swedish law on gene 
technology with the European Union, in which Sweden some years later 
became a member state. 
 
The first report is not hostile to science, but it draws some limits for the 
treatment of animals in the gene technology context. The second report 
gives power to the scientific community to form their own practices. The 
practical and legal consequences in the Swedish society have been more 
in accordance with the second report than with the first one. However, 
there were some parliamentary decisions made that from the beginning 
upset the scientific community. One of these decisions was the forming 
of a new agency for gene technology, which in fact only constituted  a 
reorganization of an agency that had been existing since 1980. Also, the 
lamentations from scientists soon abated. 
 
One cannot say that there is any difference in the treatment of animal 
ethics in Sweden as a consequence of the first or the second report. 
However, the quantity of experiments with animals modified by gene 
technology has increased considerably.3 
 
 
 
Notes 
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Patsy Hallen interviewing Julia Bell 
 
Patsy Hallen: You have quite an extraordinary life because you live in 
the company of animals and I would just like you to describe where you 
live and who you live with.  
 
Julia Bell: Thanks Patsy. I live in a little place called Ravensthorpe 
which is about two hours drive from Esperence and three hours from 
Albany in Western Australia. It is very, very dry and it is an old farming 
and mining community. There are about two hundred people in the town. 
It's very parochial, very sexist, very racist and very speciesist. I have 
lived there for three years with many companions: seven camels, five 
dogs, numerous joeys who unfortunately have died in various accidents, 
and a very spectacular carpet snake who lives in my bedroom with me. I 
have two old galahs who I rehabilitated many years ago. They have been 
with me for about fifteen years and I have numerous chickens, geese, 
turkeys, three very sweet pet pigs, a goat called Cindy who I milk and a 
ram called Minstrel because he is black and white and he still has his tail. 
My son, Byron who is 23 now, comes and goes. 
  
Patsy Hallen: It would be interesting for readers to hear why you choose 
this companionship and what you learn from these animal people with 
whom you live? 
  
Julia Bell: To answer that I will have to give some background of my 
life and how I have come to be in Ravensthorpe. I studied philosophy for 
many years completing an honours degree in moral philosophy with 
Freya Mathews at Murdoch University in Western Australia. Then I took 
off up to the Pilbura and spent some time with the Anunga Marda people 
in the Great Sandy Desert. I still had a hankering to get back to 
philosophy. I joined the bioethics program at Monash University 
working with Peter Singer and Justin Oakley. This greatly inspired me as 
I had read about Peter Singer for years and wanted to meet him and to 
spend time working with him. I completed my course work and came to 
Perth to complete my thesis as an external student. I returned to Perth 
and worked with my camels while continuing with my thesis. It was on 
vulnerability and what it means to be human. It concerned psychological 
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vulnerability as well as physical vulnerability. I was fortunate to have 
Justin Oakley as my supervisor who encouraged me in this area. When I 
came back I realized I couldn't really contemplate the vastness of what 
the thesis meant without putting myself in a physical position of doing it. 
So I thought that I would start a camel trek. I started walking from 
Spencer's Brook and ended up out on the Nullarbor Plain about five 
months later. I was walking through very cold weather to start with and 
rain and hail and then as the months wore on, I ended up in a very warm 
climate, too warm in fact, and I had to come back. I came back to Perth 
and felt claustrophobic and I related to a comment on the radio 'I'm 
laying on my bed about to turn 40 and I'm going mad'. I was about a 
week off turning 40. I suddenly realized what this meant, jumped up, 
found the house for sale in Ravensthorpe and approached my neighbour 
to buy my property. It literally happened overnight. He bought my 
property and I headed off to Ravensthorpe and got my camels back.  My 
main reason was that I had to get back to space. I had to get back with 
my camels after spending five months with them. I guess it did change 
my life in very profound ways which I cannot even express at this stage.  
 
I bought an old property in Ravensthorpe which was very dilapidated. In 
fact it was a rubbish tip. The thing that inspired me was that there was a 
small part of the property which was the only piece of land in 
Ravensthorpe that aboriginals had lived on for many years. They had left 
fifteen years ago. That is where I built my camel yards, in that very spot. 
The property is sixty three acres and for last three years I have  tried to 
rebuild it making fences, planting trees and making the house decent. As 
you can imagine the rainfall here is very low, so to keep things is alive is 
difficult. I live there with my companions in a very small house. I have 
encouraged the local frog population by creating two ponds. I have a 
whole variety of different frogs there now. I have also encouraged the 
reptile population which includes tiger snakes. I am trying to work out a 
way for us to live comfortably together without having to kill every 
second tiger snake I see which has been very difficult.  
 
That was the reason I had to get back to that gold fields country.  But 
when I arrived there I realized it was probably a foolish thing as there 
was no university and I had separated myself from my close circle of 
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female friends who I lived with very closely in Perth. To get to university 
was a six hour drive. I felt very isolated. I felt very much a minority. I 
felt I was fighting for my self preservation and identity because of battles 
with shire officials, e.g. to get camel signs on my road, to stop them 
using herbicides around my property. It was incredibly tough but I 
managed to do it.  
 
From there I started thinking how could I constructively create a 
philosophical life using my background and living with animals as I had 
chosen to live and working with the earth. I created a very viable 
vegetable garden which I basically live out of. I have tried killing my 
chickens for meat with no success. I really found it difficult wringing the 
chickens necks or chopping their heads off, so I stopped that. What I am 
trying to do now is to set up some ecological niche whereby I can live 
with the introduced animals which I have for educational purposes. I 
have children coming out from the schools and families bring their 
children. What I am trying to do in a very basic way is talk to the 
children, read them a narrative such as 'Charlotte's Web' and express to 
them very simply the ideas of intrinsic and instrumental value. I use that 
philosophical narrative in a simple way hopefully to show the children 
that there are other ways of looking at sheep and pigs than purely as a 
resource for either meat or whatever. That seems to have been quite 
successful.  
 
The other thing which I am aiming at is to get a sanctuary going for the 
wildlife endemic to the area. I have had no success with all the avenues 
I've tapped into: conservation-wise, government departments and 
departments which are meant to be helping women in rural communities.  
I've just come up against a brick wall and the story that I've been told 
runs: you can set it all up, but there is no funding.  So to keep the place 
sustained I've had to go back nursing part-time. The other thing I thought 
of doing is running philosophy groups for children, which I have done 
elsewhere. I have approached the local schools but the principals are not 
familiar with philosophy and they tell me that there is no funding even 
though I've offered my services on a voluntary basis. I hope this answers 
why I am here.    
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Patsy Hallen:  So Julia, it was really camels that galvanized you back 
into a rural setting because you couldn't keep your camels where you 
were living in Perth. Can you tell us something about sharing your life 
with camels? What are camels like and what do you like about them?  
 
Julia Bell: Camels are really quite remarkable creatures. They deserve a 
lot of respect. They are incredibly intelligent, very, very resourceful and 
very functional. When I was on my trek I used to think about Aristotelian 
ethics. Aristotle as well as the modern commentator Martha Nussbaum 
talk about what it means to be human, the primary thing is being 
functional and I think about the connection with this and how the camel 
of all animals is such a functional animal in so far as it is incredible in 
any situation. It adapts so amazingly to the heat and to the cold. It can 
recycle its urine. It is the only mammal with oval blood corpuscles. Other 
mammals have round ones and this is the reason that it doesn't hydrate 
like other  mammals. So there are all these wonderful functions which it 
has. It can slow down its whole metabolism. It can go up to three weeks 
with no water and it can go up to two months with very little food. So the 
connection between philosophy and camels is very clear to me using an 
Aristotelian framework. Sometimes I find that difficult to explain, 
especially talking to other cameleers. Talking to other philosophers I feel 
quite comfortable. So for those reasons and I also think they are very 
sensual sorts of animals. I love stroking them and spending time with 
them. I've attended the three female camels (cows) births and I have been 
very close right through the deliveries. I've trained all my camels myself 
which has taken a lot because I've been kicked and had my eyes slashed, 
and been bitten and spat on. They are very big animals as you can 
imagine. I've never hit them with polypipe which is very common 
amongst cameleers. The majority of male cameleers laugh and say you 
have got to give the animal a good hiding. I always reflect when they talk 
about camels in this way about the close connection with the feminine: 
'You have got to break her in. You have got to hobble her'. I'm always 
making these connections with my life with camels. 
 
Patsy Hallen: Yes. So the distinction which you are using is that you 
refuse to break your camels in. You really want to encourage them to 
follow you. So you want to train them rather than to break them. 
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Julia Bell:  Yes.  I actually talk about working with my camels, with all 
of my animals, rather than breaking them in.  You can never break a 
camel in. 
 
Patsy Hallen: Julia, Camels are feral but they are much less harmful on 
the natural world because they don't have hard hoofs. Would that be 
right? Compare them say to horses. How are camels in relation to horses? 
  
Julia Bell: Camels are very low maintenance compared to a horse. You 
don't have to shoe them. They have very soft pads so they don't take 
dieback into areas which are prone to dieback. Compared to a horse, a 
cow or a sheep, they don't just strip anything. They are top graziers. They 
are very selective with their eating. So even though they are feral they do 
belong to Australia. They are very well adapted to the Australian climate. 
 
Patsy Hallen: So when they take a bush, they just basically prune it. 
They don't destroy the bush? 
 
Julia Bell: Yes.  
 
Patsy Hallen: It has been said that Australia has the largest population of 
wild camels left in the world and that they are very healthy as well.  
 
Julia Bell: Yes. Australia is the only country left in the world with wild 
camels. Every other camel that you see is basically owned. The reason 
why Australian camels are in such high demand in the Middle East is that 
they are very low in diseases. They only thing that the camel has in 
Australia is mange or worms which are easily controlled. They are very 
healthy and very good stock. 
 
Patsy Hallen: I've also heard you say that they are very resourceful in so 
far as they combine being a sheep, a cow and a horse. Do you want to 
explain that? 
 
Julia Bell: What I mean by that is they have this amazing hair. It's not 
wool like a sheep. It has no lanolin and you can take the hair off in big 
sheets. You can skin it and make wonderful garments. You have 
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probably seen the '40's and '50's expensive camel hair coats. The other 
thing is that you don't have to shear them like you do a sheep. You don't 
have to do all the mulesing and all the horrible business which is really a 
necessity in the country with sheep. You get away from that. You can use 
their tail. Artists make paint brushes from their tails. It is very fine hair 
and you can make butter out of their humps. You can eat their lean meat 
which is very low in cholesterol and you can milk them. I was reading an 
article in the New Scientist recently said that the milk has properties in it 
which enhances the human immune system. Now their little pads are 
being exported to Asian countries for use as an aphrodisiac. That is just a 
side thing but overall what I mean by comparing them with a horse, a 
cow and a sheep is that they are far more functional. You can use the 
whole animal, more than any of those other animals, if you choose to but 
more than anything they make wonderful companions. They are very 
loyal, very faithful and once you make a friend with a camel, it is a bit 
like an elephant, they never forget.  
 
Patsy Hallen: Yes. I guess that they are like a sheep in that you can use 
their fur or coat. They are like a horse in so far as they are a good pack 
animal. 
 
Julia Bell: And you can also tan their leather, like a cow.  
 
Patsy Hallen: Yes. And you can milk them like a cow but that is looking 
at them in a very utilitarian way. I suppose that we are talking about 
animals that have died naturally and the problem with something like 
using their pads as aphrodisiacs for an Asian market is that might then 
drive people to kill camels just for their pads rather than looking at 
illusions of human potency or rather than addressing the psychosexual 
problems of males. We take it out on animals and slaughter animals for 
that purpose in the hope that they will give us some kind of potency. 
 
Would you Julia, being as close as you are to your camels, would you eat 
a camel? 
 
Julia Bell: I have eaten camel meat but because I am a basically a 
vegetarian, I don't like any meat unless it is an absolute necessity. I have 
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shot a young goat when I was out on the Nullarbor and  I have shot 
rabbits basically for survival and for survival, if I was in a desert, I would 
shoot a camel. I wouldn't eat one of mine unless I was starving. I would 
have to be sensible about it. I think that it is a matter of respect. It is like 
what Peter Singer is saying, 'If you can't kill it, you shouldn't eat it'. If 
you are going to kill an animal, if you use the whole animal that is better 
than just shooting them like a lot of station owners are doing in the desert 
at the moment. They claim that  the camels are destroying the fences 
which is rubbish. There is no evidence to back that up but instead of just 
shooting them and leaving them to rot, they should be used 
constructively. That is what I am trying to get at, not that I would like to 
see that done but if the populations do grow as is happening then I think 
that they should be used constructively rather than just shot and left to 
rot. It is similar with the kangaroo population - you get the arguments 
that some have to be killed. If it has to be done then it should be done 
sensitively and in a constructive way.   
 
Patsy Hallen: I always used to think that it was a waste to just shoot 
animals and let them rot until someone pointed out to me that the whole  
local natural environment might profit from them. Humans don't but all 
the worms, the grubs and the things that eat the carcass and the dingoes 
may profit.  
 
Julia Bell: Yes. There are always so many ways of looking at it. 
 
Patsy Hallen: I can remember once when I was back-packing and I was 
carrying little protein. There was a dolphin washed up on the beach 
which was clearly dead. I went over to look at it and give it my respect. I 
wondered whether I should eat it. In the end I couldn't bring myself to eat 
it even though it was dead. I guess it is a matter of respect. It was a bit 
degrading for the dolphin to have some part hacked out of it. I suppose 
eventually one of your camels will die of old age.  Would you have the 
courage to eat it or would you just bury it? 
 
Julia Bell:  No.  Only if I was starving.  To me there is no difference in 
saying if my loved one, my child or a close friend dies I would bury out 
of respect.  But I guess if I was in the middle of the Andes, as in the 
 70 
stories of plane crashes, and my loved one died, then to eat a bit of that 
meat for my survival is almost sacred. However because I don't have to 
do that I wouldn't do it. 
 
Patsy Hallen: We are participating in Earth Philosophies Australia Bush 
School and Julia is one of our honoured facilitators. This morning we 
met in a beautiful room called The Hexegon, an eight sided room built 
mostly of glass and recycled timber which sits under a canopy of very old 
kauri trees. It looks over a beautiful inlet called the Wilson Inlet which 
has got granite boulders which jut out into its basin and there are lots of 
spoon bills, pelicans, coots, ducks and swans. We were sitting there and 
Julia told us a very moving story about her lead female camel called 
Suzie and the death of Suzie's calf. Could you repeat that story for us 
Julia? 
 
Julie Bell: Susie has had two calves now since she has been with me. 
She is probably now twenty years old. Camels live up to sixty years. 
Camels are likened with the elephant. I have heard scientists discuss 
elephants and camels along with whales which is quite inspiring. She is 
not really an old cow. This was her second delivery. I had a dream weeks 
before that I had given birth to three children and the first one died. So I 
thought that something would happen to Suzie's calf. I have a close vet 
friend, who is recognized as the camel vet of Western Australia. He lives 
about three hours drive from me but on this occasion, I didn't contact 
him. 
  
I sat in the paddock with Suzie all day and I camped by her that night in 
my sleeping bag. It was a very foolish thing because camels are very 
protective of their newborn. There could have been a disaster. She could 
have jumped on me and crushed me with a hard bony prominence under 
a camel's chest. That is how they can crush you to death. I trusted her. 
I've got this amazing sense of trust and I think that there is a sense of 
reciprocity. I slept with her through the night and she was bleeding. The 
thing that moved me was that I was also menstruating so I thought of this 
strong connection with the whole cycle of life and the movement of 
things, the passage of things. I was bleeding. She was bleeding. She was 
giving birth and the moon was coming up. So it was a very special night 
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for me. She delivered and it was a breach birth. When I helped pull the 
calf out, she was struggling. I tried to give it mouth to mouth 
resuscitation to get it breathing which I did do with Suzie's first calf and I 
got that one breathing. I tried with this one but it didn't work. It was 
obviously dead. She just let me do it which amazed me. She let me 
fondle the calf. Then she turned around and sniffed it, nudged it with her 
nose and bellowed. It sounded like that harrowing whale sound. It went 
on for three days. I left her in the paddock with the calf and the placenta, 
let her smell it, let her realize the calf was dead and do her own grieving. 
For me, there was a strong connection between both of us.  After three 
days I picked the calf up and wheeled it in a wheel barrow a fair way to a 
grave yard that I had organised with the hole already dug.  She was with 
me when I put the calf into the hole and buried the calf.  
 
Patsy Hallen: And to this day you say, although there is good tucker, the 
camels won't go near.  
 
Julia Bell:  I have probably half an acre which I have set aside. I call it a 
sacred cove where I bury all of my companions. I let the camels out to 
graze on the blue bush nearby, but they never go near the cove area. 
Susie bellowed for three days and for a year after that she wouldn't let me 
near her.  She had a change of personality. I feel that she blamed me or 
thought that I had done something to the calf. It is just recently that we 
have re-connected. I have let her go very gently after the last two years. 
The interesting thing now is that I have a new camel, Betsy, who is 
pregnant and about to deliver any day. Sinbad the bull has given her a 
hard time so I have had to separate him as it is not his calf. Even though 
he is gelded he is still quite fiery. The strange thing is that Luke, a friend 
who is looking after the camels, says that Suzie has become like a 
midwife to Betsy. She follows her around. She is out in the paddock 
keeping Sinbad away. It is quite a remarkable relationship. She has taken 
on the midwife role of watching to make sure that  none of the other 
camels come and harass her while she is delivering. So they are quite 
remarkable animals.  
 
Patsy Hallen: Thank you Julia for being a midwife to our understanding 
of how better to live with animals.  I think that you are not only a 
 72 
philosopher in the traditional sense of the word insofar as you are a lover 
of wisdom but I also think you know about the wisdom of loving. 
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BOOK REVIEWS 
 
Garber, Marjorie. Dog Love. 341 pp. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1996) 
 
What does it mean to love a dog?   
 
Marjorie Garber, Director of the Center for Literary and Cultural Studies 
at Harvard, and best known for her cultural studies of bisexuality and 
cross-dressing, has mobilised her analytical talents and undertaken an 
enormous and illuminating project: a literary and popular investigation of 
our relationship to and love for dogs.     
 
Dog Love is an overview of our historical, literary and cultural 
preoccupation with dogs: from the history of breeding, to criminal and 
rescue dogs; psychoanalysis and dogs (including Freud's dogs) to the 
new, popular literary anthropomorphism; Dylan Thomas' The Portrait of 
the Dog as a Young Artist to television's Lassie; writers' dogs to 
academics' dogs (and their dogs' names); talking dogs to bestiality; 
petimony (and pooper scoopers) to DNA cloning; a dog's grief to dog 
loss. Yet despite its scope (or perhaps because of it), Garber manages to 
open up many important philosophical and ethical issues, suggesting a 
range of areas for further theoretical analysis. 
 
Having owned my very first dog (Hilda Doolittle, a kelpie named after 
the poet) for two years now, this book celebrated my new-found dog 
love, while posing questions I had only recently asked myself: What does 
it mean that I fantasise about speaking with my dog? (or more truthfully, 
fantasise about becoming-dog?) Is a dog an agent in itself or merely an 
extension of its human owner in relation to the law? Who is responsible 
for the damage a dog may do? What does the increasing jurisdiction 
around dogs and the corresponding fight for dog-rights reflect? Do 
puppies have mirror-phases, as Lacan suggests human children do? (I am 
sure I caught my dog 'stuck' in the mirror once.) Can a dog contemplate; 
can she be a philosopher? (One morning when I refused to get up, I let 
Hilda outside to wait for me. From my bedroom window I watched her 
sitting exceptionally still in the middle of the garden, her nose up, just 
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smelling the air - I imagined - and watching/ listening to the birds. She 
remained that way for a good twenty minutes.) Why is it easier 
sometimes to love my dog than my lover? Do dogs have souls?  
 
While always contemplative, Dog Love  is also a collection of real-life 
and fictional-life (dog biography and autobiography) accounts of dog-
human relationships, and the emotional, psychological, sometimes sexual 
and often financial investments we make in them.  
 
It is unbelievable as the dog who arrived to meet his owner at the subway 
station every day for nine years after his owner had died, waiting at the 
station until midnight, only to return the next day; 
 
funny as Shady Spring Kennels in Maryland which offers: '...dog-
paddling, Frisbee and hiking, a Bark-and-Ride camp bus, a camp spa 
with hairdo and pedicure, and bunk photographs for the proud parents to 
take home'; dog superstores and dog psychiatrists; 
 
disturbing and politically relevant as the tale of the pit-bull from 
notoriously racist Virginia who was in need of rescue from legal 
'execution' for being a dangerous dog; and his black owner who believed 
he could save him by explaining to the court that: 'All the ladies in the 
neighborhood like him. Not just the colored ladies. The white ladies too';   
 
and wise as Virginia Woolf's account of a Robert Browning's dog Flush 
after a haircut: 'What am I now? he thought, gazing into the glass. And 
the glass replied with the brutal sincerity of glasses, "You are nothing."    
He was nobody. Certainly he was no longer a cocker spaniel. But as he 
gazed, his ears bald now, and uncurled, seemed to twitch. It was as if the 
potent spirits of truth and laughter were whispering in them. To be 
nothing-is that not, after all, the most satisfactory state in the whole 
world?' 
 
Touching, smart, extensive and difficult to put down, this book should be 
read by anybody who loves a dog and certainly by those interested in the 
ethical and philosophical nature of dog-human relationships. 
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            Emily Ballou 
 
 
DeGrazia, David, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral 
Status, x + 302pp. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
 
Is DeGrazia a sophisticated Singer? This thought arose early in reading 
this book and hovered until the end. There is an attempt to build up a 
different philosophy of moral respect for animals but when the practical 
implications are detailed, it seems that utilitarian currents remain. For 
example, in discussing the issue of the justification of zoos for their 
entertainment value, DeGrazia says 'Entertainment is simply not a serious 
enough benefit to justify such harms [i.e. the harms of confinement, 
etc.]'. 
 
This may be a very unfair reading of the book which has many 
marvellous features. In defending a coherence model of ethical 
justification, DeGrazia puts forward a series of norms which the model 
must conform to: argumentative support, global illumination (a coherent 
system must hang together and the system must explain how the parts 
hang together), simplicity, clarity, plausibility, compatibility (or 
coherence) with whatever else we know or reasonably believe. This is an 
interesting list reminiscent of Kuhn's attempt to ground a position on the 
justification of scientific theories See T.S. Kuhn, 'Objectivity, Value 
Judgment and Theory Choice' in The Essential Tension (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977). DeGrazia goes on to state that 
fallibilistic and contextual judgements about these norms constitute a 
type of objectivity. This, I think, stretches the meaning of objectivity too 
much but one could allow for a high level of consensus on such norms 
while denying there is any objectivity here. In support of his coherence 
theory, DeGrazia says that 'an incoherent opinion, position, or theory is 
not reasonable; it does not make sense' (page 18). This is a problematic 
claim. There is equivocation on 'incoherent'. If he means by 'incoherent', 
a position which violates his theoretical norms such a position could still 
make sense. If he means 'nonsense' by the term 'incoherent' then of 
course an incoherent position does not make sense but this is not the 
same as saying that the position violates his theoretical norms.  
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In addition, DeGrazia defends 'a modified notion of impartiality or 
universalizability recognizing feminist and other criticisms of this 
notion'. He doesn't handle these criticisms entirely satisfactorily. In 
response to writers such as Gilligan who suggest that care may be a 
higher value than impartiality at least for some people, DeGrazia says 
that he isn't arguing that the care perspective is invalid just that it is 
insufficient. There is still a conflict with Gilligan. Her arguments have 
not been met. Also in the statement of the universalizability principle 
which DeGrazia accepts it is not clear how these criticisms have been 
recognized: 'Universalizability and formal justice imply that we should 
grant equal moral weight or importance to everyone's (relevantly 
similar) interests,unless there is a relevant difference between the beings 
in question '. Perhaps if more work is done on the notion of 'relevant 
difference' a possible resolution of this debate might emerge.  
 
DeGrazia makes a further move in Chapter 3 arguing that the theoretical 
virtues of the coherence model favour equal consideration of animals. 
There is careful exploration of what this might mean. Chapters 4 to 6 
deal with the mental life of animals as DeGrazia believes this study is 
necessary to determine which animals have 'basic moral status' and 
whether there are morally significant differences among beings with 
moral status. In these chapters he draws on human phenomenology, 
research in animal behaviour, functional-evolutionary arguments and 
physiological evidence. Human phenomenology is discussed as 
DeGrazia believes that we have good reason to think that many animals 
have minds whose contents are not wholly dissimilar to the contents of 
human minds. He states that human phenomenology sets the agenda for 
what kinds of mental states to look for in animals, a human-centred 
approach with obvious plausibility. Nevertheless I think that we should 
be open to the possibility that there are animal mental states which are 
different  from human ones which could be a basis for according moral 
status.  
The appropriateness of using the other three types of evidence is given a 
strong defence. For DeGrazia, taking animals seriously requires taking 
their minds seriously. So it is necessary to consider the empirical data on 
animal minds. An excellent summary of this data follows. It points to the 
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following conclusions amongst others: that we can attribute pain and 
consciousness generally to most or all vertebrates and probably at least 
some invertebrates, e.g. cephalopods; (consciousness is accepted as a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for mentation and it is 
distinguished from self-consciousness) and  we can attribute anxiety, 
fear, suffering and pleasure to most or all vertebrates and possibly a few 
invertebrates. Most or all vertebrates can think. Some animals have a 
sense of time and grizzly bears, Great apes, lesser apes, elephants and 
dolphins have self-awareness. After a careful exploration of what it is 
that constitutes language, DeGrazia concludes that dolphins and sea lions 
can master certain syntactic and semantic rules. Chimpanzees, bonobos 
and gorillas have a range of linguistic capacities. He then draws the 
general conclusion that 'some apes and cetaceans have used, and many of 
their conspecifics can do doubt learn, certain forms of language'.  
 
DeGrazia provides a short but convincing argument for the claim that at 
least some animals are moral agents, a quite novel position but one that is 
receiving some empirical support.  
 
The principle of equal consideration defended requires that equal moral 
weight be given to relevantly similar interests. After surveying standard 
forms of value theory for humans, DeGrazia supports a subjectivist 
position. He argues that all and only sentient beings have interests (based 
on his coherence theory). There is an extended discussion of the possible 
harm of death to animals, an issue which is generally not given enough 
attention. Although his conclusion is tentative he agrees that 'normal 
humans who are not thoroughly miserable and hopeless lose more from 
dying than do many animals with moral status (at least from fish through 
birds).' 
 
The principle of equal consideration requires that equal moral weight or 
importance be given to relevantly similar interests no matter who has 
them. Some implications of this principle are: a prima facie duty not to 
do harm to sentient beings;  and a duty not to kill, disable or confine 
sentient animals unnecessarily.  Some further practical consequences 
include a condemnation of factory farming,  fishing, and the practices in 
most zoos as ethically indefensible. 
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I would like to see more argument on the point that it is only sentient 
beings who have interests and deserve moral consideration. It is easy to 
say along with DeGrazia that nonsentient animals, species or ecosystems 
don't have 'relevantly similar interests' but why then do I feel a moral  
repugnance at the devastation currently being visited upon coral reefs or 
native forests around the world? Is this simply misplaced? 
 
There are some curious omissions in this book. Ted Benton's Natural 
Relations  is not mentioned. Nor is the work of Greta Gaard, Lori Gruen 
or Linda Birke.  There is almost no discussion of animal experimentation 
which is very odd given the strong defence of vegetarianism. However 
Taking Animal Seriously  does contain a wealth of well-worked out 
discussion on an impressively wide range of issues in animal ethics. It 
would make an excellent text for a course in this area. 
 
           Denise 
Russell  
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BOOK NOTES 
 
Linzey, Andrew, Animal Theology,  vii +214pp., Illinois Press, 1995. 
 
Many of the chapters in this book have been in the public domain for a 
few years as conference papers, journal articles or lectures but they still 
constitute a fresh Christian perspective on animals, confronting the view 
often read into Christianity that animals are in the world for human use. 
The first part of the book is about establishing Christian principles which 
relate to animals.  These principles turn out to imply some direct moral 
duties. The second half of Animal Theology contains an elaboration of 
these principles. Vegetarianism is defended. Animal experimentation, 
hunting and genetic engineering are all condemned with arguments 
which work well given Linzey's basic assumptions but they don't engage 
with the challenges of different views a great deal.  
 
Beck, Alan and Katcher, Aaron, Between Pets and People: The 
Importance of Animal Companionship, revised edition, xiii + 316pp., 
Purdu University Press, Indiana, 1996. 
 
Between Pets and People is a report of the research which Beck and 
Katcher conducted on human-pet interactions. They used techniques 
developed by ethologists to study animals in the wild to observe people 
and pets in parks, homes and clinic waiting rooms. They also used 
physiological measurement, e.g. of blood pressure and some 
epidemiology of health and disease. The main research was done prior to 
1983 when the first edition came out. There have been some new 
additions. The book is not very technical. In fact the style is 
conversational. Some accounts are fascinating but many readers will 
wish for more depth. 
 
Bavidge, Michael and Ground, Ian, Can we understand animal minds?  
vii + 176pp., Bristol Classical Press, London, 1994. 
 
'Mind' here is taken to refer to 'that range of capacities, states and 
processes which constitute the living experience of a creature' or the 
animal's point of view on the world. No mental entity is posited. Debates 
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in the animal sciences concerning the subjective experiences of animals 
are outlined followed by a quick run-through of various philosophical 
theories of mind. There is an attempt to defuse the problem of 
anthropomorphism and to tackle the problem of how it is that we can 
ascribe psychological concepts to non-language using animals. The 
concept of expression is employed. Can we understand animal minds  is 
a good, fast read. This is also not a 'deep' book but it does present some 
fresh insights and neatly cuts off many dead ends in philosophy of mind.  
  
Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds: The controversy over 
laboratory animals viii + 230pp., Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1997. 
 
Groves is not offering a new moral theory from which we can draw 
conclusions concerning ethics and animal experimentation. His aim is to 
describe how certain people feel about such research and their reflections 
on these feelings. The people in the study are from a 'mid-size college 
town' in the United States. They are animal rights activists and animal 
research supporters. It is probably fair to say the sample is representative 
of activists and research supporters in other Western countries. Hearts 
and Minds does highlight the complexity of attitudes and feelings on 
both sides of this divide.  Yet Groves thinks that the two groups are not 
as different as they have been made out to be with regards to their 
feelings about animals. 
 
The final chapter contains a discussion of the problems with federal and 
institutional guidelines for laboratory animal welfare. This is certainly an 
area which needs much more consideration along with the broader 
questions concerning regulation of animal research and promotion of 
alternatives. The existence of institutional guidelines and ethics 
committees often leads to unwarranted complacency.               .       
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Announcements 
 
The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare will be 
published by Greenwood Press and it is tentatively scheduled for release 
in early 1998. Edited by Marc Bekoff of the University of Colorado this 
one volume reference work will provide essays from recognized 
authorities in the field addressing the many issues of animal rights and 
animal welfare. The forward is written by Jane Goodall. For more 
information contact Marc Bekoff, EPO Biology, University of Colorado, 
Boulder, Colorado, 80309-0334, U.S.A. email: 
marc.bekoff@colorado.edu 
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